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Abstract. Generalizing standard monadic second-order logic for Kripke models, we
introduce monadic second-order logic interpreted over coalgebras for an arbitrary set
functor. We then consider invariance under behavioral equivalence of MSO-formulas. More
specifically, we investigate whether the coalgebraic mu-calculus is the bisimulation-invariant
fragment of the monadic second-order language for a given functor. Using automata-
theoretic techniques and building on recent results by the third author, we show that in
order to provide such a characterization result it suffices to find what we call an adequate
uniform construction for the coalgebraic type functor. As direct applications of this result
we obtain a partly new proof of the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem for the modal mu-calculus,
avoiding the use of syntactic normal forms, and bisimulation invariance results for the bag
functor (graded modal logic) and all exponential polynomial functors (including the “game
functor”). As a more involved application, involving additional non-trivial ideas, we also
derive a characterization theorem for the monotone modal mu-calculus, with respect to a
natural monadic second-order language for monotone neighborhood models.
1. Introduction
1.1. Logic, automata and coalgebra. The aim of this paper is to strengthen the link
between the areas of logic, automata and coalgebra. More precisely, we provide a coalgebraic
generalization of the automata-theoretic approach towards monadic second-order logic (MSO),
and we address the question of whether the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem can be generalized
from Kripke structures to the setting of arbitrary coalgebras1.
Fatemeh Seifan was supported by Vrije Competitie grant 612.001.115 of the Netherlands Organisation for
Scientific Research (NWO).
1The paper is a substantially extended version of a previous manuscript that was presented at the 2015
conference for Logic in Computer Science (LICS 2015) in Kyoto, Japan [7].
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The connection between monadic second-order logic and automata is classic, going
back to the seminal work of Bu¨chi, Rabin, and others. Rabin’s decidability result for the
monadic second-order theory of binary trees, or S2S, makes use of a translation of monadic
second-order logic into a class of automata, thus reducing the satisfiability problem for S2S to
the non-emptiness problem for the corresponding automata [28]. The link between MSO and
automata over trees with arbitrary branching was further explored by Walukiewicz [36]. Janin
and Walukiewicz considered monadic second-order logic interpreted over Kripke structures,
and used automata-theoretic techniques to obtain a van Benthem-like characterization
theorem for monadic second-order logic, identifying the modal µ-calculus as the bisimulation
invariant fragment of MSO [13]. Given the fact that in many applications bisimilar models
are considered to represent the same process, one has little interest in properties of models
that are not bisimulation invariant. Thus the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem can be seen as an
expressive completeness result, stating that all relevant properties in monadic second-order
logic can be expressed in the modal µ-calculus.
Coalgebra enters naturally into this picture. Recall that Universal Coalgebra [29]
provides the notion of a coalgebra as the natural mathematical generalization of state-based
evolving systems such as streams, (infinite) trees, Kripke models, (probabilistic) transition
systems, and many others. This approach combines simplicity with generality and wide
applicability: many features, including input, output, nondeterminism, probability, and
interaction, can easily be encoded in the coalgebra type T (formally an endofunctor on
the category Set of sets as objects with functions as arrows). Starting with Moss’ seminal
paper [23], coalgebraic logics have been developed for the purpose of specifying and reasoning
about behavior, one of the most fundamental concepts that allows for a natural coalgebraic
formalization. And with Kripke structures constituting key examples of coalgebras, it
should come as no surprise that most coalgebraic logics are some kind of modification or
generalization of modal logic [5].
The coalgebraic modal logics that we consider here originate with Pattinson [27]; they
are characterized by a completely standard syntax, in which the semantics of each modality
is determined by a so-called predicate lifting (see Definition 3.8 below). Many well-known
variations of modal logic in fact arise as the coalgebraic logic associated with a set Λ of such
predicate liftings; examples include both standard and (monotone) neighborhood modal
logic, graded and probabilistic modal logic, coalition logic, and conditional logic. Extensions
of coalgebraic modal logics with fixpoint operators, needed for describing ongoing behavior,
were developed in [33, 4].
The link between coalgebra and automata theory is by now well-established. For instance,
finite state automata operating on finite words have been recognized as key examples of
coalgebra from the outset [29]. More relevant for the purpose of this paper is the link with
precisely the kind of automata mentioned earlier, since the (potentially infinite) objects on
which these devices operate, such as streams, trees and Kripke frames, usually are coalgebras.
Thus, the automata-theoretic perspective on modal fixpoint logic may be lifted to the
abstraction level of coalgebra [33, 8]. In fact, many key results in the theory of automata
operating on infinite objects, such as Muller & Schupp’s Simulation Theorem [25] can in
fact be seen as instances of more general theorems in Universal Coalgebra [15].
1.2. Coalgebraic monadic second-order logic. Missing from this picture is, to start
with, a coalgebraic version of (monadic) second-order logic. Filling this gap is the first aim
of the current paper, which introduces a notion of monadic second-order logic MSOT for
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coalgebras of type T. Our formalism combines two ideas from the literature. First of all, we
looked for inspiration to the coalgebraic versions of first-order logic of Litak & alii [17]. These
authors introduced Coalgebraic Predicate Logic as a common generalisation of first-order
logic and coalgebraic modal logic, combining first-order quantification with coalgebraic
syntax based on predicate liftings. Our formalism MSOT will combine a similar syntactic
feature with second-order quantification. In fact it can be shown to contain the Coalgebraic
Predicate Logic of Litak & alii as a fragment, though we will omit the verification of this
fact.
Second, following the tradition in automata-theoretic approaches towards monadic
second-order logic, our formalism will be one-sorted. That is, we only allow second-order
quantification in our language, relying on the fact that individual quantification, when
called for, can be encoded as second-order quantification relativized to singleton sets. Since
predicate liftings are defined as families of maps on powerset algebras, these two ideas fit
together very well, to the effect that our second-order logic is in some sense simpler than
the first-order formalism of [17].
In section 4 we will define, for any set Λ of monotone2 predicate liftings, a formalism
MSOΛ, and we let MSOT denote the logic obtained by taking for Λ the set of all monotone
predicate liftings. Clearly we will make sure that this definition generalizes the standard
case, in the sense that the standard version of MSO for Kripke structures instantiates the
logic MSO{♦} and is equivalent to the coalgebraic logic MSOP (where P denotes the power set
functor).
The introduction of a monadic second-order logic MSOT for T-coalgebras naturally raises
the question, for which T does the coalgebraic modal µ-calculus for T, denoted µMLT,
correspond to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of MSOT.
Question 1.1. Which functors T satisfy µMLT ≡ MSOT/∼?
1.3. Automata for coalgebraic monadic second-order logic. In order to address
Question 1.1, we take an automata-theoretic perspective on the logics MSOT and µMLT, and
as the second contribution of this paper we introduce a class of parity automata for MSOT.
As usual, the operational semantics of our automata is given in terms of a two-player
acceptance game, which proceeds in rounds moving from one basic position to another,
where a basic position is a pair consisting of a state of the automaton and a point in the
coalgebra structure under consideration. In each round, the two players, ∃ and ∀, focus on
a certain local ‘window’ on the coalgebra structure. This ‘window’ takes the shape of a
one-step T-model, that is, a triple (X,α, V ) consisting of a set X, a chosen object α ∈ TX
(representing partial information about the transition map of the coalgebra as seen from the
perspective of some given state), and a valuation V interpreting the states of the automaton
as subsets of X. More specifically, during each round of the game it is the task of ∃ to come
up with a valuation V that creates a one-step model in which a certain one-step formula δ
(determined by the current basic position in the game) is true.
Generally, our automata will have the shape A = (A,∆,Ω, aI) where A is a finite
carrier set with initial state aI ∈ A, and Ω and ∆ are the parity and transition map of A,
respectively. The flavour of such an automaton is largely determined by the co-domain of its
2In the most general case, restricting to monotone predicate liftings is not needed, one could define MSOT
as the logic obtained by taking for Λ the set of all predicate liftings. However, in the context of this paper,
where we take an automata-theoretic perspective on MSO, this restriction makes sense.
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transition map ∆, the so-called one-step language which consists of the one-step formulas
that feature in the acceptance game as described.
Each one-step language L induces its own class of automata Aut(L). For instance, the
class of automata corresponding to the coalgebraic fixpoint logic µMLΛ can be given as
Aut(MLΛ), where MLΛ is the set of positive modal formulas of depth one that use modalities
from Λ [8]. Basically then, the problem of finding the right class of automata for the
coalgebraic monadic second-order logic MSOΛ consists in the identification of an appropriate
one-step language. Our proposal comprises a one-step second-order logic SOΛ which uses
predicate liftings to describe the chosen object of the one-step model.
Finally, note that similar to the case of standard MSO, the equivalence between formulas
in MSOT and automata in Aut(SOΛ) is only guaranteed to hold for coalgebras that are
‘tree-like’ in some sense (to be defined further on).
Theorem 1.2 (Automata for coalgebraic MSO). For any set Λ of monotone predicate liftings
for T there is an effective construction mapping any formula ϕ ∈ MSOΛ into an automaton
Aϕ ∈ Aut(SOΛ), which is equivalent to ϕ over T-tree models.
The proof of Theorem 1.2 proceeds by induction on the complexity of MSOT-formulas, and
thus involves various closure properties of automata, such as closure under complementation,
union and projection. In order to establish these results, it will be convenient to take an
abstract perspective revealing how closure properties of a class of automata are completely
determined at the level of the one-step language, similar to the development in [36].
1.4. Bisimulation Invariance. With automata-theoretic characterizations in place for
both coalgebraic MSO and the coalgebraic µ-calculus µML, we can address Question 1.1 by
considering the following question:
Question 1.3. Which functors T satisfy Aut(MLT) ≡ Aut(SOT)/∼?
Continuing the program of the third author [35], we will approach this question at the
level of the one-step languages, SO and ML. To start with, observe that any translation (from
one-step formulas in) SO to (one-step formulas in) ML naturally induces a translation from
SO-automata to ML-automata. A new observation we make here is that any so-called uniform
construction on the class of one-step models for the functor T that satisfies certain adequacy
conditions, provides (1) a translation (·)∗ : SO→ ML, together with (2) a construction (·)∗
transforming a pointed T-model (S, s) into a tree model (S∗, s∗) which is a coalgebraic
pre-image of (S, s) satisfying
A accepts (S∗, s∗) iff A∗ accepts (S, s).
where A∗ is obtained by applying to A the lifting of the one-step translation (·)∗ : SO→ ML
to the level of automata. From this it easily follows that an SO-automaton A is bisimulation
invariant iff it is equivalent to the ML-automaton A∗.
On the basis of these observations we can prove the following generalisation of the
Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem.
Theorem 1.4 (Coalgebraic Bisimulation Invariance). Let T be any set functor. If T admits
an adequate uniform construction for every finite set of second-order one-step formulas Γ,
then
MSOT/∼ ≡ µMLT.
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In our view, the proof of this theorem separates the ‘clean’, abstract part of bisimulation-
invariance results from the more functor-specific parts. As a consequence, Theorem 1.4
can be used to obtain immediate results in particular cases. Examples include the power
set functor (standard Kripke structures), where the adequate uniform construction roughly
consists of taking ω-fold products (see Example 5.15), the bag functor (Example 5.16), and
all exponential polynomial functors (Corollary 5.18).
However, it turns out that there are cases of functors that provably do not admit an
adequate uniform construction. A concrete example is the monotone neighborhood functor
M (see the next section for its definition), which provides the semantics for monotone modal
logic [10] and its fixpoint extension, the monotone µ-calculus. The monotone µ-calculus is
interesting for at least two reasons: first, it has a purely theoretical interest as a natural
candidate for a minimal modal µ-calculus, since the only constraint on the box operator
is monotonicity rather than the stronger constraint of complete multiplicativity of the box
operator in normal modal logic. In other words, the base modal logic has precisely the
logical strength it needs so that Knaster-Tarski-style extremal fixpoints may be smoothly
introduced, and no more. Second, a more application driven reason to study the monotone
µ-calculus is that it is the natural fixpoint logic in which Parikh’s dynamic logic of games
[26] sits as a fragment in the same manner that PDL is a fragment of the modal µ-calculus.
(More precisely, game logic is a fragment of a multi-modal variant of the monotone modal
µ-calculus, but we will stick to the monomodal case for the sake of notational convenience.)
As the final contribution of this paper we show how, with some extra work, a characterization
result for the monotone µ-calculus can be derived using our main result 1.4, with respect to
a natural monadic second-order language for monotone neighborhood structures that we
call “monotone MSO”.
Theorem 1.5. The monotone µ-calculus is the fragment of monotone MSO that is invariant
for neighborhood bisimulations.
2. Some technical background
In this section we provide some of the necessary technical background. We shall assume
familiarity with coalgebras, and at least some basic acquaintance with modal logic and the
modal µ-calculus. We will provide insofar as possible a self-contained presentation of the
required material on automata and infinite games.
2.1. Automata. Throughout most of its history, the mathematical theory surrounding the
modal µ-calculus has relied heavily on the theory of automata operating on infinite objects
and, what is closely related, infinite games. It turns out that these frameworks fit nicely
into the coalgebraic world view, which is to be expected as infinite games and automata
operating on infinite objects both have a coinductive flavour. This connection is in fact a
big part of what makes the coalgebraic modal µ-calculus tick, and will be central to this
paper. In this section we give a brief overview of this field. The material that we cover is
entirely standard, so readers who are already familiar with these topics will want to merely
skim the section to fix notation and terminology.
We start with something that probably most readers have already come across at some
point: the theory of word automata recognizing regular languages over some alphabet. (For
an introduction to the basic concepts of automata theory, see [11].)
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Definition 2.1. A (non-deterministic) word automaton is a tuple:
(A,∆, aI , F )
where A is a finite set, ∆ : A× Σ→ P(A), aI ∈ A and F ⊆ A.
The general mold into which many types of automata fit is of this shape: they consist
of a set of states (A), a transition structure (∆) telling us how to move between states of
the automaton, an initial state (aI) and, finally, some data structure over A that lets us
know whether or not a given computation carried out by an automaton accepts or rejects its
input. In the case of word automata, the input ~w of an automaton is a finite word c0....cn
over the alphabet Σ (i.e. an element of Σn for some n).
Definition 2.2. A run of the automaton A on a word ~w is a tuple a0....an+1 of states in A,
such that a0 = aI and ai+1 ∈ ∆(ai, ci) for i ≤ n. The run is said to be accepting if an+1 ∈ F ,
and we say that A accepts the word ~w if there is some accepting run of A on the input
~w. The language L(A) of an automaton A is simply the collection of all the words that it
accepts.
A central technique in automata theory is to show that one can simplify the transition
structure of some class of automata, without losing any expressive power. In the case of
word automata, it is well known that the non-deterministic automata that we have defined
here have the same expressive power as deterministic word automata, which are defined as
ones that satisfy the condition that ∆(a, c) is a singleton for each a ∈ A. This means that
there is a unique run of the automaton on every input.
Fact 2.3 (Simulation of word automata). For every word automaton A, there exists a
deterministic word automaton A′ with L(A) = L(A′).
The proof consists of an elegant construction known as the powerset construction: given
an automaton A = (A,∆, aI , F ), we construct a deterministic automaton A′ = (A′,∆′, a′I , F ′)
recognizing the same language by setting A′ = P(A), a′I = {aI}, the accepting states are
defined by
F ′ = {B ⊆ A | B ∩ F 6= ∅}
and the transition structure is defined
∆′(B, c) =
⋃
{∆(b, c) | b ∈ B}.
Intuitively, the states of A′ consist of “macro-states” over A, consisting of several states of
A being visited at once, and a run of A′ on a word can be viewed as a “bundle” of runs
of A on the same word. These sorts of simulation theorems turn up in various places, for
various types of automata. In particular, one of our main technical results of this paper is a
simulation theorem, allowing us to simplify the transition structure of the automata that we
introduce for monadic second-order logic interpreted on coalgebras.
In this paper we are mainly interested in automata that, unlike word automata, classify
infinite objects. The simplest non-trivial example of this is the theory of automata operating
on infinite words, or streams as we shall call them. For a given alphabet Σ, a Σ-stream
is an ω-sequence of elements of Σ. Automata that are used to classify streams are called
stream automata. The simplest kind of stream automata, known as Bu¨chi automata, are
simply the same as word automata: they consist of a set of states A, a transition relation
∆ : A× Σ→ P(A), a start state aI and a set F of accepting states. The difference is in the
definition of acceptance.
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Definition 2.4. Given a stream c0c1c2c3... over Σ, a run of the automaton A is a stream
a0a1a2a3... over A, such that a0 = aI and ai+1 ∈ ∆(ai, ci) for all i < ω. The run is said to
be accepting if the following acceptance condition is met: for infinitely many i ∈ I, we have
ai ∈ F .
In other words, a run is accepting if from each given point in the computation, the
automaton will eventually end up in an accepting state. The language L(A) consists of the
set of Σ-streams accepted by A.
Again, one of the central results about stream automata is a simulation theorem.
However, here the Bu¨chi condition is not flexible enough - it is a standard fact that
deterministic Bu¨chi automata have strictly less expressive power than non-deterministic
ones. To obtain a simulation theorem, we need to switch to a more sophisticated acceptance
condition, and several are available (see [34] for an overview). For the purposes of the present
paper, the most natural condition is the parity condition.
Given a finite set A, a priority map is simply a map Ω : A → ω, assigning a natural
number to each element of A. Such a map encodes, in a compact way, two pieces of
information that we want to keep track of: first, it partitions the states in A into two sets,
the states with even priority and the ones with odd priority. Intuitively, think of the states
with even priority as the accepting states. Second, the priority map encodes an ordering of
the states, where states of higher priority are regarded as more important when determining
whether or not a run is accepting. A parity stream automaton is then a tuple (A,∆, aI ,Ω),
where Ω is a priority map. A run a0a1a2... on some stream is now said to be accepting if
the highest number k such that Ω(ai) = k for infinitely many i is an even number. In other
words: the run visits some accepting state a infinitely many times, and any non-accepting
state that is also visited infinitely many times has lower priority than a.
Switching from Bu¨chi automata to parity automata does not give any more expressive
power: the two automaton models are expressively equivalent. The point of the parity
condition is that we now have a simulation theorem available:
Fact 2.5 (Simulation of stream automata). For every parity stream automaton A, there
is a deterministic parity stream automaton A′ (i.e. such that ∆′(a′, c) is a singleton for all
a′ ∈ A′) with L(A) = L(A′).
A standard proof of this simulation theorem for stream automata uses a construction due
to Safra, which is quite involved compared to the powerset construction for word automata.
We refer to [34] for the details.
Simulation theorems are particularly useful for proving closure properties of automata;
for example, given a deterministic parity stream automaton A, it is trivial to define its
complement, i.e. an automaton that accepts all and only those streams that are not accepted
by A. The construction just adjusts the priority map: if Ω was the priority map of A,
then define the complement of A to be just like A but with the priority map Ω′ defined by
Ω′(a) = Ω(a) + 1.
2.2. Infinite games. The automata we considered in the previous section are all of a fairly
simple character: when processing a word or a stream, these automata simply change their
state depending on the input that they read, in a deterministic or non-deterministic manner,
and the sequence of states visited in this manner is what we have called a run. For more
complex automaton models, this notion of a “run” of the automaton on some input will
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no longer be adequate - more elaborate models of computation will be required. Here, the
theory of infinite games has turned out be a powerful mathematical framework, providing
simple and perspicious models of how automata process their input. The idea is to think of
the computation carried out by an automaton as a game between two players with opposite
goals: one player tries to defend the view that the input should be accepted, the other tries
to show that it should be rejected.
Definition 2.6. A board game G is a tuple (B∃, B∀, E,W ) where B∃ and B∀ are disjoint
sets, E ⊆ B ×B where B = B∃ ∪B∀ (this union is called the board) and W is a map from
the set Bω of B-streams into the set {∃,∀}. Elements of B are called positions.
Intuitively, ∃ (or Eloise) and ∀ (or Abelard) are the players, B∃ consists of the positions
on the board at which it is ∃’s turn to move, and similarly for B∀. Finally, the relation E
tells us what the legal moves are at a given position of the game. It can happen that there
are no legal moves at all at a position of the game.
There is nothing to prevent that a match of a board game could go on indefinitely.
In fact this is crucial to the connection between infinite games and automata operating
on non-wellfounded structures, in which the computation carried out by the automaton
processing some input can be infinitely long. In these cases, the map W will be used to
decide a winner. Formally:
Definition 2.7. Let G = (B∃, B∀, E,W ) be any board game. A match in G is either a
finite tuple of positions pi0...pin or an infinite sequence pi0pi1pi2... of positions in B, such that
aiEai+1 for all i ∈ ω (or for all i < n, if the match is finite.) A match ρ is called complete
if it is infinite, or if E[pi] = {pi′ | piEpi′} = ∅ where pi is the last position on ρ. If ρ is not
complete it is called a partial match. The set of partial matches ρ of G for which the last
position pi of ρ belongs to Π, and such that E[pi] 6= ∅, is denoted by PM(G,Π). The winner
of an infinite match ρ is defined to be W (ρ), and the winner of a complete but finite match
is ∃ if the last position is in B∀, and ∀ if the last position of the match is in B∃. In these
cases, we say that the losing player got stuck.
Definition 2.8. A strategy for a player Π in a board game G is a map χ : PM(G,Π)→ B.
A match ρ (complete or partial) is said to be χ-guided if, for every proper initial segment ρ′
of ρ that belongs to PM(G,Π), the tuple ρ′χ(ρ′) is also an initial segment of ρ.
Finally, a strategy χ for Π is said to be a winning strategy at a position pi in G if every
χ-guided match beginning with the position pi is won by Π. If there is a winning strategy
for Π at the position pi then we say that pi is a winning position for Π.
Remark 2.9. The reader may be more familiar with a different terminology here, where the
word “play” is used for what we call a “match”, and a play is said to “respect the strategy
χ” if it is χ-guided in our sense.
In practice, when we define a winning strategy χ for either player in a game G for
some given position pi, we will usually only take care to define the strategy on those partial
matches that are actually reachable from the position pi by a χ-guided match.
A special role in connection with automata is played by parity games, where the winning
condition W is defined via a map Ω : B → ω, such that the range Ω[B] of this map is finite.
We then set W (ρ) = ∃ if the highest natural number k such that Ω(pii) = k for infinitely
many i ∈ ω is an even number, and we set W (ρ) = ∀ otherwise. It follows straightforwardly
from a classic result in the theory of infinite games, the Borel determinacy theorem [18], that
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all parity games are determined, meaning that the winning positions for ∃ and ∀ partition
the board: every position is winning for one of the two players. However, a much stronger
and quite useful property holds for parity games:
Definition 2.10. A strategy χ for Π is said to be positional if, for any two partial matches
ρ1, ρ2 ∈ PM(G,Π) such that the last positions of ρ1 and ρ2 are identical, we have χ(ρ1) =
χ(ρ2).
A positional strategy for Π can thus be represented equivalently as a map χ : B+Π → B,
where
B+Π = {pi ∈ BΠ | E[pi] 6= ∅}.
Fact 2.11 (Positional Determinacy). Let G be a parity game. Then for every position
pi ∈ B, there exists a unique player Π ∈ {∃, ∀} and a positional winning strategy for Π at
the position pi.
Several proofs of the positional determinacy theorem are known, see [6, 24, 37]. We will
briefly consider games with non-parity winning condition later; however, all the games we
consider will be determined (although not necessarily by positional strategies), as an easy
consequence of the Borel determinacy theorem.
2.3. Logics for Kripke models and their automata. With the required machinery in
place, we are ready to explain the connection between infinite games, automata, monadic
second-order logic and the modal µ-calculus.
Let us start by briefly reviewing monadic second-order logic and the modal µ-calculus,
viewed as languages for reasoning about Kripke models. For simplicity we restrict our
attention to Kripke models with just one accessibility relation, i.e. models for modal logic in
the basic similarity type with just one diamond and one box. Let Var be a fixed infinite
supply of variables.
Definition 2.12. A Kripke model is a structure S = (S,R, V ) where S is a set, R ⊆ S × S
and V : Var → P(S) is a Var -valuation. A pointed Kripke model is a structure (S, s) where
S is a Kripke model and s is a point in S.
Associated with a valuation V , we define the conjugate coloring V † : S → P(Var) by
V †(s) := {p ∈ Var | s ∈ V (p)}. Given a subset Z ⊆ S, the valuation V [p 7→ Z] is as V
except that it maps the variable p to Z.
Turning to syntax, we define the formulas of monadic second-order logic MSO through
the following grammar:
ϕ ::= sr(p) | p ⊆ q | R(p, q) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃p.ϕ
with p, q ∈ Var . (Here, sr stands for “source”.) We define > := ∀p.p ⊆ p and ⊥ := ¬>.
Formulas are evaluated over pointed Kripke models by the following induction:
• (S,R, V, s)  sr(p) iff V (p) = {s}
• (S,R, V, s)  p ⊆ q iff V (p) ⊆ V (q)
• (S,R, V, s)  R(p, q) iff for all v ∈ V (p) there is w ∈ V (q) with vRw
• standard clauses for the boolean connectives
• (S,R, V, s)  ∃p.ϕ iff (S,R, V [p 7→ Z], s)  ϕ for some Z ⊆ S.
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We present the language of the modal µ-calculus µML in negation normal form, by the
following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ♦ϕ | ηp.ϕ
where p ∈ Var , η ∈ {µ, ν}, and in the formula ηp.ϕ no free occurrence of the variable p in ϕ
may be in the scope of a negation. We define > := νp.p and ⊥ := µp.p.
The satisfaction relation between pointed Kripke models and formulas in µML is defined
by the usual induction, with, e.g.
• (S,R, V, s)  µp.ϕ iff s ∈ ⋂{Z ⊆ S | ϕp(Z) ⊆ Z} where ϕp(Z) denotes the truth set of
the formula ϕ in the model (S,R, V [p 7→ Z]).
We assume familiarity with the notion of bisimilarity between two (pointed) Kripke models,
and say that a formula of MSO is bisimulation invariant if it has the same truth value in any
pair of bisimilar pointed Kripke models.
Fact 2.13 (Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem [13]). A formula ϕ of MSO is equivalent to a formula
of µML iff ϕ is invariant for bisimulations.
Generally, given two languages L and L′ we shall write L ≡ L′ to say that every formula
of L is semantically equivalent to a formula of L′, and vice versa. We will denote the
bisimulation invariant fragment of L by L/∼. With this notation we can state the previous
fact more succinctly as:
µML ≡ MSO/∼
The proof of the Janin-Walukiewicz theorem proceeds by comparing suitable automaton
models for MSO and the modal µ-calculus. To get an understanding of how MSO-automata
on Kripke models work, the main conceptual step one needs to take from the perspective
of word and stream automata is to take a logical view on the transition structure of an
automaton, i.e. the transition map of an automaton will be constructed from formulas in a
logical system. Let A be a set (of variables). The language of first-order logic with equality
over A is given by the grammar:
a(x) | x = y | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | ∃x.ϕ
where a ∈ A and x, y belong to some fixed, countably infinite set of individual variables.
The set of sentences in this language is denoted FOE(A), and the set of sentences in
which each a ∈ A appears positively is denoted by FOE+(A). The fragment of FOE(A) in
which the equality symbol does not occur is denoted by FO(A), and we write FO+(A) for
FOE+(A) ∩ FO(A).
A model for this language, in the usual sense, is simply a set X together with an
assignment of a subset of X to each a ∈ A, viewed as a predicate - in other words, a
valuation V : A→ P(X).
Definition 2.14. Let P be a set of propositional variables. A P -chromatic MSO-automaton
A is a tuple (A,∆, aI ,Ω), where A is a finite set, aI ∈ A, Ω : A→ ω is a priority map and
∆ : A× P(P )→ FOE+(A)
is the transition map, assigning a sentence in FOE+(A) to each pair (a,Q) with a ∈ A and
Q ⊆ P .
Note that, in this automaton model, the powerset of P takes on the role of an alphabet
of the automaton. In order to decide whether or not an automaton A accepts or rejects a
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given pointed Kripke model S, s, we define a parity game called the acceptance game for
A with respect to the model S. The role of ∃ is to act as a “defense attorney”, in favor of
acceptance of the model, and the goal of ∀ is to act as a “prosecutor” trying to show that
the model should be rejected. A “round” of this game will have the following shape: first,
the automaton is in a state a and is visiting some point s in the model S. At such a basic
position of the acceptance game, it will be ∃’s turn to move, and her moves are constrained
by the transition map. Formally, she needs to come up with a valuation U : A→ P(R[s])
over the immediate successors of s with respect to the accessibility relation, such that the
one-step Kripke model (R[s], U) satisfies the FOE+(A)-sentence ∆(a, V †(s) ∩ P ). Here, we
think of V †(s) ∩ P - the collection of propositional variables in P true at the point s - as
the input from the alphabet currently being read by the automaton. In practice, we will
assume that we are dealing with a model in which the valuation V assigns an empty value
to each variable not in P , so that we may just write V †(s) rather than V †(s) ∩ P .
For a more precise description of the game, we provide the positions, player assignments,
admissible moves and priorities of the acceptance game in a table:
Position Player Admissible moves Priority
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {U : A→ P(R[s]) | (R[s], U)  ∆(a, V †(s))} Ω(a)
U : A→ PS ∀ {(b, t) | t ∈ U(b)} 0
Table 1: Acceptance game for MSO-automata
Given s ∈ S, we say that A accepts the pointed model (S, s) if (a, s) is a winning position
for ∃ in the acceptance game. In practice, we will often identify a partial match of the form:
(a0, s0)U0(a1, s1)U1...Un−1(an, sn)
of the acceptance game belonging with the sequence of basic positions
(a0, s0)....(an, sn)
appearing in the match.
It may be helpful at this point to compare the acceptance game for these automata to
the notion of acceptance we presented for stream automata in Section 2.1. In particular, the
reader can may check that an accepting run of a non-deterministic parity stream automaton
can be viewed as a winning strategy for ∃ in a parity game, but one in which the role of the
opposing player ∀ becomes trivialized: all choices in this game will belong to ∃.
MSO-formulas are not equivalent to MSO-automata in general. To obtain the desired
connection between formulas of MSO and MSO-automata, it is necessary to restrict attention
to pointed Kripke models (S,R, V, u) that are tree-like, i.e. such that the underlying frame
(S,R) is a tree rooted at u. The following result is proved in [36]:
Fact 2.15. For every formula ϕ of MSO with free second-order variables P , there exists a
P -chromatic MSO-automaton accepting all and only those tree-like pointed Kripke models
that satisfy ϕ.
A converse of this result also holds, so that any MSO-automaton can be translated to a
sentence of MSO that is equivalent to it over tree-like models. Furthermore, a key insight
behind the Janin-Walukiewicz theorem is that MSO automata are very closely related to an
automaton model that is suitable to model µ-calculus formulas, on arbitrary Kripke models.
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Fact 2.16. A class of pointed Kripke models is definable by a formula in µML with free
variables P if, and only if, it is recognized by some P -chromatic MSO-automaton such that,
for all Q ⊆ P and a ∈ A, we have ∆(a,Q) ∈ FO+(A).
The proof of Fact 2.15 involves establishing a number of closure properties of MSO-
automata, corresponding to the logical connectives. For example, negation corresponds to
complementation on the automata side, where the complement of an automaton A accepts
precisely those inputs that are rejected by A. Similarly, the union of A and B accepts
precisely those inputs accepted by either A or B, and corresponds to disjunction on the logical
side. The most difficult property to establish is projection, corresponding to second-order
quantification. The solution lies in a simulation theorem for MSO-automata, simplifying the
formulas appearing in the range of the transition map.
Definition 2.17. A formula in FOE+(A) is said to be a disjunctive formula if it is a
disjunction of formulas of the form:
∃x1...∃xn(diff(x1, ..., xn) ∧ a1(x1) ∧ ... ∧ an(xn) ∧ ∀y(diff(x1, ..., xn, y)→ b1(y) ∨ ... ∨ bk(y)))
where a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bk ∈ A and diff(z1, ..., zm) is an abbreviation for the formula:∧
1≤i<j≤m
¬(zi = zj)
A P -chromatic MSO-automaton A is said to be non-deterministic if, for all a ∈ A and all
Q ⊆ P , the formula ∆(a,Q) is disjunctive.
Fact 2.18 (Simulation of MSO-automata). For every MSO-automaton A, there exists a non-
deterministic MSO-automaton A′ that accepts the same tree-like pointed Kripke models as
A.
One of our contributions in this paper is a purely semantic account of what makes
disjunctive formulas useful, that is independent of their rather specific syntax and thus
suitable for our more abstract setting.
3. Coalgebras and generic modal fixpoint logics
3.1. Coalgebras and models. In the general case our basic semantic structures will consist
of coalgebras together with valuations. We only consider coalgebras over the base category
Set with sets as objects and functions as arrows. The co- and contravariant power set
functors will be denoted by P : Set → Set and Q : Set → Setop, respectively. We recall
the actions of these functors on morphisms: given f : X → Y , we have Pf(Z) = f [Z] for
Z ⊆ X, and Qf(Z) = f−1(Z) for Z ⊆ Y . Covariant endofunctors on Set will be called set
functors.
Convention 3.1. We will make an additional assumption on all set functors here: we
require that they preserve all monics in Set, i.e. that Tf is an injective map whenever f
is. This is a very mild constraint, since it very nearly holds for all set functors already, the
only possible exception being maps with empty domain [32]. So throughout this paper, “set
functor” will be taken to mean: “set functor that preserves all monics”. All the functors we
consider here will satisfy the constraint.
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Definition 3.2. Let T be a set functor. A T-coalgebra is a pair (S, σ) consisting of a set
S, together with a map σ : S → TS. A T-model is a structure S = (S, σ, V ) where (S, σ)
is a T-coalgebra and V : Var → PS. A pointed T-model is a structure (S, s) where S is a
T-model and s ∈ S.
The usual notion of a p-morphism between Kripke models can be generalized as follows:
Definition 3.3. Let S1 = (S1, σ1, V1) and S2 = (S2, σ2, V2) be two T-models and let
f : S1 → S2 be any map. Then f is said to be a T-model morphism if:
(1) for each variable p and each u ∈ S1, we have u ∈ V1(p) iff f(u) ∈ V2(p);
(2) the map f is a coalgebra morphism, i.e. we have
σ2 ◦ f = Tf ◦ σ1.
Definition 3.4. Two pointed T-models (S, s) and (S′, s′) are said to be behaviourally
equivalent, notation: (S, s) ∼ (S′, s′), if s and s′ can be identified by morphisms f : S→ T
and f ′ : S′ → T such that f(s) = f ′(s′) (for some T-model T).
It is well known that coalgebras and coalgebra morphisms for a set functor form a
co-complete category, since its forgetful functor creates colimits [1]. In particular this means
that coproducts of arbitrary families of T-models exist, and they correspond to disjoint
unions of models in the case of Kripke semantics. Concretely, we define disjoint unions of
T-models as follows:
Definition 3.5. Let {Si}i∈I be a family of T-models, where Si = (Si, σi, Vi). Then we define
the disjoint union
∐
i∈I Si = (S′, σ′, V ′) by first setting S′ =
∐
i∈I Si to be the disjoint union
of the sets Si. Let fi denote the insertion map of Si into S
′. Then we define σ′ to be the
unique map with the property that σ′ ◦ fi = Tfi ◦ σi for all i ∈ I. For p ∈ Var we define
V ′(p) =
⋃
i∈I fi[Vi(p)].
Fact 3.6. For each j ∈ I, the insertion map fj : Sj →
∐
i∈I Si is a T-model morphism.
Kripke models are T-models for T equal to the (covariant) power set functor P, and
two pointed Kripke models are behaviourally equivalent iff they are bisimilar in the usual
sense. Comprehensive lists of examples of coalgebraic modal logics for various type functors
and their applications can be found in several research papers by various authors, see for
example [5]. We shall review some of these examples later, when we consider applications
of our main characterization results. One functor that will be of particular interest in this
paper is the monotone neighborhood functor M, usually defined as the subfunctor of Q ◦ Q
given by setting MX ⊆ QQX to be:
{N ∈ QQX | ∀Z,Z ′ : Z ∈ N & Z ⊆ Z ′ ⇒ Z ′ ∈ N}.
Following the usual terminology we shall often refer to M-models as neighborhood models.
There is a standard definition of bisimilarity for neighborhood models:
Definition 3.7. A neighborhood bisimulation between neighborhood models S1 and S2 is a
relation R ⊆ S1 × S2 such that, if s1Rs2 then:
• V †1 (s1) = V †2 (s2);
• for all Z1 in σ1(s1) there is Z2 in σ2(s2) such that for all t2 ∈ Z2 there is t1 ∈ Z1 with
t1Rt2;
• for all Z2 in σ2(s2) there is Z1 in σ1(s1) such that for all t1 ∈ Z1 there is t2 ∈ Z2 with
t1Rt2.
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Neighborhood bisimilarity coincides with behavioural equivalence for M, and in the
next section we shall see how neighborhood bisimulations arise from a relation lifting for M.
In many cases, behavioural equivalence of coalgebras can be described more concretely
by bisimulations defined via certain relation liftings. For some work specificially on this topic,
see the following papers by Marti and Venema: [19, 20, 21]. As an example, bisimilarity
of Kripke models can be described using what is known as the “Egli-Milner lifting” for
the powerset functor. This lifting assigns to a relation R ⊆ X × Y the “lifted” relation
P(R) ⊆ PX × PY defined by:
(α, β) ∈ P(R)⇔ (∀x ∈ α∃y ∈ β : xRy) & (∀y ∈ β∃x ∈ α : xRy)
When the functor satisfies a certain condition, preservation of weak pullbacks, the appropriate
relation lifting can be defined directly in terms of the functor. In the special case of
endofunctors on Set, weak pullback preservation can be described rather concretely as the
following condition [9]: consider any pair of maps f1 : X1 → Y and f2 : X2 → Y , and any
α1 ∈ TX1, α2 ∈ TX2 with Tf1(α1) = Tf2(α2). Let
R = {(u, v) ∈ X1 ×X2 | f1(u) = f2(v)}
That is, R together with its projection maps pi1 : R→ X1 and pi2 : R→ X2 is the pullback
of the co-span f1, f2 in Set. Then T preserves weak pullbacks if, in this situation, we can
always find some γ ∈ TR with Tpi1(γ) = α1 and Tpi2(γ) = α2.
Provided that T preserves weak pullbacks, we can define a relation lifting T known
as the Barr extension of T [3]. This is a functor on the category Rel of sets with binary
relations as arrows, and formally its action on a relation R ⊆ X1 ×X2 is defined by setting:
TR := {(α1, α2) ∈ TX1 × TX2 | ∃γ ∈ TR : Tpi1(γ) = α & Tpi2(γ) = α2}
The Egli-Milner lifting is the Barr extension of the covariant powerset functor, and bisimula-
tions that are sound and complete for behavioural equivalence can be defined from the Barr
extension of a functor in precisely the same manner as standard bisimulations are defined
from the Egli-Milner lifting. This will not play a big role in the present paper, but the Barr
extension will make a minor appearance when we discuss some basic facts about predicate
liftings. We remark that the monotone neighborhood functor is known not to preserve weak
pullbacks, so neighborhood bisimulations can not be recovered via the Barr extension. This
was in fact part of the motivation behind the work on relation liftings by Marti and Venema.
3.2. The coalgebraic µ-calculus. The modal µ-calculus is just one in a family of logical
systems that may collectively be referred to as the coalgebraic µ-calculus [4]. Generally, the
key notion that connects coalgebra with logic is that of a predicate lifting. Here, we recall
that Q denotes the contravariant powerset functor, as defined in Section 3.1.
Definition 3.8. Given a set functor T, an n-place predicate lifting for T is a natural
transformation
λ : Qn → Q ◦ T,
where Qn denotes the n-fold product of Q with itself. A predicate lifting λ is said to be
monotone if
λX(Y1, ..., Yn) ⊆ λX(Z1, ..., Zn),
whenever Yi ⊆ Zi for each i. The Boolean dual λd of λ is defined by
(Z1, ..., Zn) 7→ TX \ (λX(X \ Z1, ..., X \ Zn)).
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We shall often think of an arbitrary finite set A of size n as being identified with the
set {1, ..., n} via some fixed one-to-one correspondence, so that we may view any natural
transformation λ : QA → Q ◦ T as an n-place predicate lifting. In these cases we sometimes
speak of “predicate liftings over A” rather than “n-place predicate liftings”, but note that
this is merely a notational variation rather than a substantial generalization of the notion of
predicate liftings. A predicate lifting λ over A can be represented equivalently as a subset of
TPA, via an application of the Yoneda lemma (this observation is due to Schro¨der, [31]).
Roughly speaking, predicate liftings are used to express “local” properties about the next
unfolding of the transition map of a coalgebra, viewed from a given state of the coalgebra
and using properties of states in the coalgebra as parameters.
Given a set functor T and a set of monotone predicate liftings Λ for T, the language
µMLΛ of the coalgebraic µ-calculus based on Λ is defined as follows. Again we present the
language in negation normal form; note that we make sure that the modal operators of the
language are closed under Boolean duals.
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | λ(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) | λd(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ηp.ϕ
where p ∈ Var , λ ∈ Λ, η ∈ {µ, ν}, and, in ηp.ϕ, no free occurrence of the variable p in ϕ is
in the scope of a negation. If Λ consists of all monotone predicate liftings for T, then we
denote the language µMLΛ also by µMLT.
The semantics of formulas in a pointed T-model (S, s), where S = (S, σ, V ), is defined
as follows:
• (S, s)  p iff s ∈ V (p) and (S, s)  ¬p iff s /∈ V (p).
• If λ ∈ Λ or is the dual of some lifting in Λ, we set (S, s)  λ(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff σ(s) ∈
λS(‖ϕ1‖, ..., ‖ϕn‖), where ‖ϕi‖ = {t ∈ S | (S, t)  ϕi}.
• Standard clauses for the boolean connectives
• (S, s)  µp.ϕ iff s ∈ ⋂{X ⊆ S | ϕp(X) ⊆ X}, where ϕp(Z) denotes the truth set of the
formula ϕ in the T-model (S, σ, V [p 7→ Z]).
It is routine to prove that all formulas in µMLT are bisimulation invariant, i.e. they have
the same truth value in every pair of behaviourally equivalent pointed T-models. (We shall
continue to use the term “bisimulation invariant” rather than “invariant for behavioural
equivalence”, although strictly speaking bisimulation and behavioural equivalence are distinct
concepts.)
Example 3.9. The powerset functor P has a unary predicate lifting ♦ defined by setting,
for α ∈ PX:
α ∈ ♦X(Z)⇔ α ∩ Z 6= ∅
The language µML{♦} is precisely the standard modal µ-calculus µML. The dual of ♦ is
denoted , as usual. We recall its standard definition in modal logic as ψ := ¬♦¬ψ, which
is in accordance with our definition of the dual of a predicate lifting.
Example 3.10. The monotone neighborhood functor comes equipped with a unary predicate
lifting, which we shall also denote by the symbol . It is defined by setting, for α ∈MX:
α ∈ X(Z)⇔ Z ∈ α
In fact, we can embed P as a subfunctor of M by mapping α ∈ PX to the neighborhood
structure {Z ⊆ X | α ⊆ Z}. Clearly the two predicate liftings denoted by  both agree on
this subfunctor, so it makes sense to use the same symbol to denote both. This lifting for
M corresponds to the usual box modality for monotone modal logic, and so the language
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µML{} corresponds to a fixpoint extension of monotone modal logic that we will here refer
to as the monotone µ-calculus, denoted µMML. The logic µMML is a very natural system to
study: in a sense, it is the minimal modal µ-calculus since the only constraint we put on
the box modality is monotonicity, which is precisely what is needed for the semantics of the
fixpoint operators to be well defined. It is a well-behaved system: it was recently shown to
have uniform interpolation [22], and we shall show here that it enjoys a Janin-Walukiewicz
style characterization theorem.
3.3. Coalgebraic automata. Turning to the parity automata corresponding to the lan-
guage µMLΛ, we first define the modal one-step language 1MLΛ.
Definition 3.11. The set 1MLΛ(A) of modal one-step formulas over a set A of variables is
given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | > | λ(ψ1, ..., ψn) | λd(ψ1, ..., ψn) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
where ψ1, ..., ψn are formulas built up from variables in A using disjunctions and conjunctions.
More formally, we require that ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Latt(A) where Latt(A) denotes the set of lattice
formulas over A given by the grammar:
⊥ | > | a | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
where a ranges over A.
Definition 3.12. Given a functor T and a set of variables A, a one-step model over A is a
triple (X,α, V ) where X is any set, α ∈ TX and V : A→ Q(X) is a valuation.
Note that we have written the valuation V as having the type A→ Q(X) rather than
A → P(X) in this definition. This notation is equally correct since the covariant and
contravariant powerset functors differ only in their action on morphisms, and it is sometimes
a more convenient notation since the naturality condition of predicate liftings is formulated
in terms of Q and not P.
The semantics of formulas in the modal one-step language in a one-step model is given
as follows:
• standard clauses for the boolean connectives,
• (X,α, V ) 1 λ(ψ1, ..., ψn) iff α ∈ λX(‖ψ1‖V , ..., ‖ψn‖V )
where ‖ψi‖V ⊆ X is the (classical) truth set of the formula ψi under the valuation V . Formally,
this is defined by ‖⊥‖V = ∅, ‖>‖V = X, ‖a‖V = V (a) for a ∈ A, ‖ϕ ∧ ψ‖V = ‖ϕ‖V ∩ ‖ψ‖V
and ‖ϕ ∨ ψ‖V = ‖ϕ‖V ∪ ‖ψ‖V . For u ∈ X and a lattice formula ψ we also write u 0V ψ to
say that u ∈ ‖ψ‖V .
Recalling that any predicate lifting over a set of n variables A corresponds to an n-
place predicate lifting, we can view any predicate lifting λ over A as a one-step formula
in 1ML{λ}(A)3. With this mind we can write (X,α, V ) 1 λ instead of α ∈ λX(V ). In this
3Or rather, if we want to be completely precise, λ corresponds to a one-step formula in 1ML{λ′}(A) where
the lifting λ′ : Qn → Q ◦ T is obtained by composing λ with the natural isomorphism between functors Qn
and QA induced by some fixed bijection i : n → A. If we write A = {a1, ..., an} with ak = f(k − 1), this
means that we have λX(V ) = λ
′
X(V (a1), ..., V (an)). We shall permit some abuse of notation and simply
identify λ with the associated lifting λ′.
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notation the naturality constraint for a predicate lifting λ over A becomes, for every α ∈ X,
every map f : X → Y and every V : A→ Q(Y ):
(X,α,Qf ◦ V ) 1 λ ⇔ (Y,Tf(α), V ) 1 λ.
We can now define the class of automata used to characterize the coalgebraic µ-calculus.
Definition 3.13. Let P be a finite set of variables and Λ a set of predicate liftings. Then a
(P -chromatic) modal Λ-automaton is a tuple (A,∆,Ω, aI) where A is a finite set of states
with aI ∈ A,
∆ : A× P(P )→ 1MLΛ(A)
is the transition map of the automaton, and Ω : A→ ω is the parity map. The class of these
automata is denoted as Aut(1MLΛ).
Note that there are two distinct sets of “variables” involved in the automaton A, and it
is important to keep these apart since they have different roles: the variables P are used to
provide the alphabet of the automaton (and correspond to free variables of corresponding
fixpoint formulas), while the variables A are the states of the automaton (and correspond to
bound variables of a corresponding fixpoint formula.)
The acceptance game for an automaton A = (A,∆,Ω, aI) and a T-model (S, σ, V ) is
the parity game given by the following table:
Position Player Admissible moves Priority
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {U ∈ (PS)A | (S, σ(s), U) 1 ∆(a, V †(s))} Ω(a)
U : A→ PS ∀ {(b, t) | t ∈ U(b)} 0
Table 2: Acceptance game for modal automata
The loser of a finite match is the player who got stuck, and the winner of an infinite
match is ∃ if the greatest parity that appears infinitely often in the match is even, and
the winner is ∀ if this parity is odd. Note that the valuations U and V in Table 2 play
fundamentally different roles: V is a fixed valuation given by the model on which the
automaton is run, assigning values to the open variables of the automaton, while U is a
“local” valuation assigning values to the states of the automaton, which correspond roughly
to bound variables of a fixpoint formula.
Given a strategy χ for either player, a match is said to be χ-guided if it is consistent
with every choice made by that player according to χ. Winning strategies are defined as
usual.
Definition 3.14. The automaton A accepts the pointed model (S, s), written (S, s)  A,
if ∃ has a winning strategy in the acceptance game from the starting position (aI , s). We
say that an automaton A is equivalent to a formula ϕ ∈ µMLΛ if, for every pointed T-model
(S, s), we have that A accepts (S, s) iff (S, s)  ϕ.
Fact 3.15. [8] Let T be a set functor, and Λ a set of monotone predicate liftings for T.
Then
µMLΛ ≡ Aut(1MLΛ).
That is, there are effective transformations of formulas in µMLΛ into equivalent automata in
Aut(1MLΛ), and vice versa.
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3.4. One-step expressive completeness. Our main result in this paper is formulated in
terms of the set of all monotone predicate liftings for a given functor, and we would argue
that this is a rather natural choice. However, in some cases it is possible to choose some
smaller set of liftings, in order to have a more concrete and manageable presentation of the
syntax of the corresponding µ-calculus. It will then be important to choose an expressively
complete set of predicate liftings, meaning that any monotone lifting for the functor can be
defined by a formula in the modal one-step language. In particular, this will be required to
recover the Janin-Walukiewicz theorem in its original form as a special case of our main
results.
Definition 3.16. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings and λ any predicate lifting
over the finite set A. We say that λ is Λ-definable if there is a formula ϕ ∈ 1MLΛ(A) such
that, for any one-step model (X,α, V ) we have:
α ∈ λX(V ) iff (X,α, V ) 1 ϕ.
We say that a set of monotone predicate liftings Λ is expressively complete if every monotone
predicate lifting over any given finite set A is Λ-definable.
Our main observation in this section is that any weak pullback preserving functor that
also preserves finite sets has a natural choice of expressively complete predicate liftings.
Definition 3.17. Given a functor T that preserves weak pullbacks, the n-ary Moss lifting
corresponding to α ∈ T{1, ..., n} is the predicate lifting 〈α〉 : Qn → Q ◦ T such that for all
sets X and Z1, ..., Zn ⊆ X, we have:
〈α〉X(Z1, ..., Zn) = {β ∈ TX | (β, α) ∈ TR}
where R ⊆ X × {1, ..., n} is defined by uRk iff u ∈ Zk.
In particular, for any given lattice formulas ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ A, any β ∈ T{1, ..., n} and any
one-step model (X,α, V ) over A, we have:
X,α, V 1 〈β〉(ψ1, ..., ψn) iff (α,Tf(β)) ∈ T(0V )
where f : {1, ..., n} → {ψ1, ..., ψn} is the map defined by k 7→ ψk.
Note that the Moss lifting 〈α〉 is always a natural transformation, as required: it is
obtained by composing the natural transformation hα : Qn → T ◦ Q defined by
hαX(f) := Tf(α), for f : n→ QX,
with the distributive law δ : T ◦ Q → Q ◦ T defined for β ∈ TQX by:
δX(β) := {γ ∈ TX | (γ, β) ∈ T∈X}
where ∈X is the membership relation from X to QX. That this distributive law is a natural
transformation is a standard fact, see for example [16] where this view of Moss formulas as
special predicate liftings is investigated thoroughly.
Proposition 3.18. If T preserves weak pullbacks and finite sets, then the set of all Moss
liftings for T (of all arities n ∈ ω) is expressively complete.
Proof. Fix a monotone predicate lifting λ over A. Let (X,α, V ) be any one-step model over
A. Let n be the number of lattice formulas over A, and let f : Latt(A)→ {1, ..., n} be some
fixed bijective enumeration of Latt(A), so that we can write
Latt(A) = f−1({1, ..., n}) = {ψ1, ..., ψn}
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Let θ : X → Latt(A) be the map sending each u ∈ X to ∧{a ∈ A | u ∈ V (a)}. The
characteristic formula of (X,α, V ), denoted χ(X,α, V ), is defined as:
〈T(f ◦ θ)(α)〉(ψ1, ..., ψn)
It is an exercise in coalgebra to show that, for any one-step model (X ′, α′, V ′), we have
X ′, α′, V ′ 1 χ(X,α, V ) iff (α, α′) ∈ T()
where we write u  u′, for u ∈ X and u′ ∈ X ′, if u ∈ V (a) implies u′ ∈ V ′(a) for all a ∈ A.
Furthemore, there are only finitely many characteristic formulas relative to any given set of
variables A, since T preserves finite sets (and hence T{1, ..., n} is finite). We claim that the
formula:
ϕ :=
∨
{χ(X,α, V ) | α ∈ λX(V )}
defines the monotone lifting λ. One direction is clear: if α ∈ λX(V ) then X,α, V 1 ϕ since
(X,α, V ) 1 χ(X,α, V ). Conversely, suppose that X,α, V 1 ϕ. Then there exists some
one-step model (X ′, α′, V ′) such that α′ ∈ λX′(V ′) and (α′, α) ∈ T(). Write R = {(u, v) |
u  v}, let pi′ : R → X ′ and pi : R → X be the projection maps, and let γ ∈ TR be such
that Tpi′(γ) = α′ and Tpi(γ) = α. By naturality we get γ ∈ λR(Qpi′ ◦ V ′), by monotonicity
we get γ ∈ λR(Qpi ◦ V ) (since pi′(r) ∈ V ′(a) implies pi(r) ∈ V (a) for all a ∈ A), and finally
by naturality again we get γ ∈ λX(V ) as required.
In the special case of the powerset functor, given a set of formulas {ψ1, ..., ψn} (viewed
as a member of P(Latt(A))), the corresponding substitution instance of the n-ary Moss
lifting corresponds to the usual “cover” formula ∇{ψ1, ..., ψn} which is defined in terms of ♦
and its dual by:
∇{ψ1, ..., ψn} := ♦ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ♦ψn ∧(ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψn)
Hence, it follows from Proposition 3.18 that the single lifting ♦ for P is expressively complete.
4. Coalgebraic MSO
4.1. Introducing coalgebraic MSO. We now introduce coalgebraic monadic second-order
logic for a set functor T and a set of liftings Λ, and show how MSO can be recovered as
a special case. Given a set Λ of monotone predicate liftings, we define the syntax of the
monadic second-order logic MSOΛ by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= sr(p) | p ⊆ q | λ(p, q1, .., qn) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ¬ϕ | ∃p.ϕ
where λ is any n-place monotone predicate lifting in Λ and p, q, q1, ..., qn ∈ V ar. For Λ equal
to the set of all monotone predicate liftings for T, we write MSOΛ = MSOT.
For the semantics, let (S, s) be a pointed T-model. We define the satisfaction relation
 ⊆ S × MSOT as follows:
• (S, s)  sr(p) iff V (p) = {s},
• (S, s)  p ⊆ q iff V (p) ⊆ V (q),
• (S, s)  λ(p, q1, ..., qn) iff σ(v) ∈ λS(V (q1), .., V (qn)) for all v ∈ V (p),
• standard clauses for the Boolean connectives,
• (S, s)  ∃p.ϕ iff (S, σ, V [p 7→ Z], s)  ϕ, some Z ⊆ S.
We introduce the following abbreviations:
• p = q for p ⊆ q ∧ q ⊆ p,
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• Em(p) for ∀q.(p ⊆ q),
• Sing(p) for ¬Em(p) ∧ ∀q(q ⊆ p→ (Em(q) ∨ q = p)),
expressing, respectively, that p and q are equal, that p denotes the empty set, and that p
denotes a singleton.
Clearly, standard MSO is a notational variant of the logic MSO{♦}, since the formula R(p, q)
has precisely the same satisfaction clause as ♦(p, q) - to see this, one just has to unfold the
definitions. We can state the Janin-Walukiewicz theorem in a formula as:
µML{♦} ≡ MSO{♦}/∼
The following useful fact is fairly easy to check, so we leave its proof to the reader:
Fact 4.1. If Λ is a one-step expressively complete set of predicate liftings, then MSOΛ ≡ MSOT
and µMLΛ ≡ µMLT.
Since we know that ♦ is expressively complete we can now state the Janin-Walukiewicz
theorem in yet another form, where we recall that P is the covariant powerset functor:
µMLP ≡ MSOP/∼
Generally, we let MSOT/∼ denote the fragment of MSOT that is invariant for behavioural
equivalence, and we refer to it as the bisimulation invariant fragment of MSOT.
As mentioned in the introduction, the key question in this paper will be to compare
the expressive power of coalgebraic monadic second-order logic to that of the coalgebraic
µ-calculus. The following observation, of which the (routine) proof is omitted, provides the
easy part of the link.
Proposition 4.2. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for the set functor T. There
is an inductively defined translation (·) mapping any formula ϕ ∈ µMLΛ to a semantically
equivalent formula ϕ ∈ MSOΛ.
Considering the lifting  forM, we introduce the name monotone monadic second-order
logic for the language MSO{}, which we will henceforth denote by MMSO. Note that the
atomic formula (p, q) encodes a pattern of quantifier alternation of the form ∀∃∀: it says
that every state that satisfies p has some neighborhood Z such that every state in Z satisfies
q.
4.2. Automata for coalgebraic MSO. In this section we introduce automata for coalgebraic
monadic second-order logic, and translate formulas of MSOΛ into automata operating on
tree-like coalgebras.
Since the translation of standard MSO into parity automata is valid only over trees and
not over Kripke frames in general, we should expect that coalgebraic monadic second-order
logic similarly translates into parity automata over a restricted class of T-models that are in
some sense “tree-like”. So we need to start by spelling out exactly what this means.
Definition 4.3. Given a set S and α ∈ TS, a subset X ⊆ S is said to be a support for α
if there is some β ∈ TX with TιX,S(β) = α. A supporting Kripke frame for a T-coalgebra
(S, σ) is a binary relation R ⊆ S × S such that, for all u ∈ S, R(u) = {v | uRv} is a support
for σ(u).
EXPRESSIVE COMPLETENESS FOR COALGEBRAIC µ-CALCULI 21
Given that X ⊆ S is a support for α ∈ TS, our convention that T preserves all injectives
guarantees that there is a unique α′ ∈ TX such that TιX,S(α′) = α. We shall denote this α′
by α|X . Intuitively, X is a support for α if we can know all there is to know about α just by
looking at its restriction α|X to X.
Definition 4.4. A T-tree model is a structure (S, R, u) where S = (S, σ, V ) is a T-model and
u ∈ S, such that R is a supporting Kripke frame for the coalgebra (S, σ), and furthermore
(S,R) is a tree rooted at u (i.e. there is a unique R-path from u to w for each w ∈ S).
Our goal is to translate formulas in MSOT to equivalent automata over T-tree models. We
start by introducing a very general type of automaton, originating with [35]. The motivation
for taking this general perspective is to emphasize that many automata theoretic concepts
and basic results apply already in this setting, and we believe the general automaton concept
we introduce here has some independent theoretical interest.
Definition 4.5. Given a finite set A, a generalized predicate lifting over A comprises an
assignment of a map
ϕX : (QX)A → QTX.
to every set X. Concepts like boolean dual and monotonicity apply to these liftings in the
obvious way.
The difference with respect to standard predicate liftings is that the components of a
generalized predicate lifting do not need to form a natural transformation. Throughout the
rest of the paper, the term “predicate lifting” will be reserved for the subclass of general
predicate liftings that satisfy the naturality constraint, i.e. predicate liftings in the usual
sense. 4
Definition 4.6. A one-step language L for a functor T consists of a collection L(A) of
generalized predicate liftings for T, for every finite set A.
As for ordinary predicate liftings, given a generalized predicate lifting ϕ and a one-step
model (X,α, V ) we sometimes write (X,α, V ) 1 ϕ rather than α ∈ ϕX(V ).
Our automata will be indexed by a (finite) set of variables involved, corresponding to
the set of free variables of the MSOT-formula.
Definition 4.7. Let P ⊆ Var be a finite set of variables and let L be a one-step language
for the functor T. A (P -chromatic) L-automaton is a structure (A,∆,Ω, aI) where
• A is a finite set, with aI ∈ A,
• Ω : A→ ω is a parity map, and
• ∆ : A× P(P )→ L(A) is the transition map of A.
There are two main differences between these automata and the modal automata we
have considered in Section 3.3; first, we have dropped the naturality constraint on the
one-step language. Second, these automata will run on T-tree models rather than T-models.
The acceptance game of A with respect to a T-tree model (T,R, σ, V, u) is given by Table 3.
We say that the automaton A accepts the model (T,R, σ, V, u) if ∃ has a winning strategy
in this game (initialized at position (aI , u)).
4 In the style of abstract logic, it would make sense to require a generalized predicate lifting to be natural
with respect to certain maps, the natural choice in this case being bijections. For the purpose of this paper
such a restriction is not needed, however.
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Position Player Admissible moves Priority
(a, s) ∈ A× T ∃ {U : A→ P(R(s)) | (R(s), σ(s)|R(s), U) 1 ∆(a, V †(s))} Ω(a)
U : A→ P(T ) ∀ {(b, t) | t ∈ U(b)} 0
Table 3: Acceptance game for L-automata.
4.3. Closure properties. The abstract perspective of generalized predicate liftings is useful
for establishing some simple closure properties of automata, based on properties of the
one-step language. The first, easy, results establish sufficient conditions for closure under
union and complementation.
Proposition 4.8. If the one-step language L is closed under disjunction, then the class of
L-automata is closed under union.
Definition 4.9. An L-automaton A is said to be monotone if, for all a ∈ A and all colors
c ∈ P(P ), the generalized lifting ∆(a, c) is monotone in each variable in A.
Proposition 4.10. If the monotone fragment of the one-step language L is closed under
boolean duals, then the class of monotone L-automata is closed under complementation.
The most interesting property concerns closure under existential projection.
Definition 4.11. Let A be a P -chromatic L-automaton, and let p ∈ P . Then a P \ {p}-
chromatic L-automaton B is said to be an existential projection of A if it accepts a T-tree model
(T,R, σ, V, u) precisely when there is some Z ⊆ T such that A accepts (T,R, σ, V [p 7→ Z], u).
The following notion originates with [13], but instead of relying on a particular syntactic
shape of one-step formulas as in [13], we define the concepts in purely semantic terms.
Definition 4.12. A generalized predicate lifting ϕ over A is said to be disjunctive if, for
every one-step model (X,α, V ) such that
(X,α, V ) 1 ϕ
there is a valuation V ∗ : A→ Q(X) such that
• V ∗(a) ⊆ V (a) for each a ∈ A,
• V ∗(a) ∩ V ∗(b) = ∅ whenever a 6= b, and
• (X,α, V ∗) 1 ϕ.
The second clause can also be stated as: (V ∗)†(u) is either empty or a singleton, for all u ∈ X.
Call an L-automaton non-deterministic if every generalized lifting ∆(a, c) is disjunctive.
It is easy to see that if the language L is closed under disjunctions, then so is its
disjunctive fragment. From this we obtain the following.
Proposition 4.13. If the one-step language L is closed under disjunction, then the class of
non-deterministic L-automata is closed under existential projection over T-tree models.
Proof. Suppose A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) is a non-deterministic L-automaton for the variable set P .
Define the P \ {p}-chromatic automaton ∃p.A = (A,∆∗, aI ,Ω) by setting
∆∗(a, c) = ∆(a, c) ∨∆(a, c ∪ {p}).
Every T-tree model accepted by A is also accepted by ∃p.A, since any admissible move for ∃
at a position (a, u) in the acceptance game for A is an admissible move at the same position
in the acceptance game for ∃p.A too, by definition of the transition map ∆∗.
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Conversely, suppose ∃p.A accepts some T-tree model (S,R, σ, V, sI). For each winning
position (a, s) in the acceptance game, let V(a,s) be the valuation chosen by ∃ according to
some given winning strategy χ. Note that we can assume that χ is a positional winning
strategy, since ∃p.A is a parity automaton. Since disjunctive formulas are closed under
disjunctions, the automaton ∃p.A is a non-deterministic automaton, and so for each winning
position (a, s) there is a valuation V ∗(a,s) : A→ P(R(s)), which is an admissible move for ∃,
such that V ∗(a,s)(b) ⊆ V(a,s)(b) and such that for all b1 6= b2 ∈ A we have V ∗(a,s)(b1)∩V ∗(a,s)(b2) =
∅. Define the strategy χ∗ by letting ∃ choose the valuation V ∗(a,s) at each winning position
(a, s) - this is still a winning strategy, since the valuations chosen by ∃ are smaller and so
no new choices for ∀ are introduced. Furthermore, χ∗ is clearly still a positional winning
strategy.
From these facts it follows by a simple induction on the depth of the nodes in the
supporting tree that the strategy χ∗ is separating, i.e. that for every s ∈ S there is at most
one automaton state a such that (a, s) appears in a χ∗-guided match of the acceptance game.
So we can define a valuation V ′ like V except we evaluate p to be true at all and only the
states s such that
(R(s), σ(s), V ∗(as,s)) 1 ∆(as, c ∪ {p}),
where as is a necessarily unique automaton state such that (a, s) appears in some χ
∗-guided
match, and c is the color consisting of the variables true under V at s. Then A accepts
(S,R, σ, V ′, sI), by the positional strategy mapping each position (a, s) to the valuation
χ∗(a, s). That is, ∃ can play the same strategy χ∗(a, s), now viewed as a strategy in the
acceptance game for A.
4.4. Second-order automata. We now introduce a concrete one-step language for a given
set functor T and a given set of monotone predicate liftings Λ, and show that MSOΛ can be
translated into the corresponding class of automata. By the closure properties established
in the previous section, the language needs to be closed under disjunction and negation, and
furthermore we need to establish that every automaton for this language is equivalent to a
non-deterministic automaton.
Definition 4.14. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T. The set of second-order
one-step formulas over any set of variables A and relative to the set of liftings Λ is defined
by the grammar:
ϕ ::= a ⊆ b | λ(a1, ..., an) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃a.ϕ,
where a, b, a1, ..., an ∈ A and λ is any predicate lifting in Λ.
The semantics of a second-order one-step formula in a one-step model (X,α, V ) (with
V : A→ P(X)) is defined by the following clauses:
• (X,α, V ) 1 a ⊆ b iff V (a) ⊆ V (b),
• (X,α, V ) 1 λ(a1, ..., an) iff α ∈ λX(V (a1), ..., V (an)),
• standard clauses for the Boolean connectives,
• (X,α, V ) 1 ∃a.ϕ iff (X,α, V [a 7→ S]) 1 ϕ for some S ⊆ X.
Fixing an infinite set of “one-step variables” Var1, and given a finite set A, the set of
second-order one-step sentences over A, denoted 1SOΛ(A), is the set of one-step formulas
over A ∪ Var1, with all free variables belonging to A.
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Remark 4.15. The difference between the one-step language 1SOΛ(A) and the full language
MSOΛ may seem rather subtle at first sight. It is important to note that an n-place predicate
lifting now corresponds to an n-place predicate in the language, not an n+ 1-place predicate
as in MSOΛ. While the formula λ(q1, ..., qn) of 1SOΛ(A) expresses a proposition about the
specific, fixed object α in a given one-step model, the formula λ(p, q1, ..., qn) in MSOΛ rather
describes the transition map of a coalgebra as a whole: it says that the condition λ(q1, ..., qn)
holds for the unfolding of each state s that satisfies p.
Any second-order one-step A-sentence ϕ can be regarded as a generalized predicate
lifting over A, with
ϕX(V ) = {α ∈ TX | (X,α, V ) 1 ϕ}.
In particular, general concepts like monotonicity and closure under boolean duals apply to
second-order one-step sentences. Also, note that second-order sentences are invariant under
a natural notion of isomorphism:
Definition 4.16. An isomorphism between two one-step models (X1, α1, V1) and (X2, α2, V2)
is a bijection i : X1 → X2 such that Ti(α1) = α2 and V †1 (u) = V †2 (i(u)) for each u ∈ X1.
Proposition 4.17. Given any set of predicate liftings Λ and a set of variables A, any two
isomorphic one-step models satisfy the same formulas in the one-step language 1SOΛ(A).
We can now introduce second-order automata; since every sentence in 1SOΛ(A) corre-
sponds to a generalized predicate lifting, we may view 1SOΛ (the assignment of the one-step
second-order A-sentences 1SOΛ(A) to every set of variables A) as a one-step language in the
sense of Definition 4.6. Hence the following definition is sound:
Definition 4.18. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T. A second-order Λ-
automaton is an 1SOΛ-automaton. We write Aut(1SOΛ) to denote this class, and Aut(1SOT)
in case Λ is the set of all monotone predicate liftings for T.
Formulas of 1SOT(A) are not in general monotone in the variables A since negation is
present in the language (unlike the one-step language 1MLΛ). However, a useful trick due to
Walukiewicz allows us at any time to safely replace all one-step formulas in an automaton
by monotone ones:
Proposition 4.19. Let Λ be any set of monotone predicate liftings. Then every second-
order automaton A ∈ Aut(1SOΛ) is equivalent to a monotone second-order automaton
A ∈ Aut(1SOΛ).
Proof. Enumerate A as {a1, ..., ak}, and just replace each formula ∆(a, c) by
∃z1...∃zk.z1 ⊆ a1 ∧ ... ∧ zk ⊆ ak ∧∆(a, c)[(zi/ai)i∈{1,...,k}]
where ∆(a, c)[(zi/ai)i∈{1,...,k}] is the result of substituting the variable zi for each open
variable ai in ∆(a, c). This new formula is monotone in the variables A and the resulting
automaton is equivalent to A.
Our aim in this section is to show that every formula of MSOΛ is equivalent to a monotone
second-order Λ-automaton, and we shall prove this by induction on the complexity of a
formula. By the previous proposition, it suffices at each step to prove the existence of a
second-order Λ-automaton equivalent to the given formula, since this automaton is then
guaranteed to be equivalent to a monotone one. So the induction proceeds as follows:
first, we produce second-order automata equivalent to all atomic formulas. By Proposition
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4.19 this gives us monotone second-order automata for all atomic formulas. Then, for the
inductive steps, we assume that we are given monotone second-order automata equivalent
to ϕ and ψ respectively. Our aim is to produce second-order automata that are equivalent
to ϕ ∨ ψ, ¬ϕ and ∃p.ϕ, and once this is established we can apply Proposition 4.19 again to
finish the induction.
For the atomic formulas, we present only the case of formulas of the form λ(p, q1, ..., qn).
First, note that by naturality of λ, we have for any given T-tree model (S, R, s) that
(S, R, s)  λ(p, q1, ..., qn) if, and only if, for each u ∈ V (p):
σ(s)|R(s) ∈ λR(s)(V (q1) ∩R(s), ..., V (qn) ∩R(s))
With this in mind, it is not hard to check that the following automaton A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) is
equivalent to λ(p, q1, ..., qn) over T-tree models, where:
• A = {aI , b1, ..., bn}
• Ω(aI) = Ω(b1) = ... = Ω(bn) = 0
• ∆(aI , c) =
{ ∀z.z ⊆ aI if p /∈ c
λ(b1, ..., bn) ∧ ∀z.z ⊆ aI if p ∈ c
}
• ∆(bi, c) =
{ ⊥ if qi /∈ c
> if qi ∈ c
}
Intuitively, this automaton goes on indefinitely searching the underlying tree of the model
for states that satisfy p, and whenever it finds such a state u it checks whether u ∈
λS(V (q1), ..., V (qn)).
For the induction, we treat the Boolean cases first: the one-step language is clearly
closed under disjunction, so second-order Λ-automata are closed under union by Proposition
4.8. For negation, suppose we have a monotone second-order automaton A equivalent to ϕ.
It is not hard to show that for any monotone one-step formula we can define its Boolean
dual in the one-step language, and furthermore the dual is again monotone. Hence, since A
was monotone, we find an automaton B equivalent to ¬ϕ by Proposition 4.10. To complete
the translation of MSOΛ into second-order Λ-automata we now only need to prove closure
under existential projection.
4.5. A coalgebraic simulation theorem. In this section we prove that (monotone) second-
order Λ-automata are closed under existential projection. The key to this result is to prove
a simulation theorem, showing that every second-order automaton is equivalent to a non-
deterministic one. The result then follows from Proposition 4.13.
The intuition behind the simulation theorem is the same as that behind the standard
“powerset construction” for word automata: the states of the new non-deterministic automaton
An are “macro-states” representing several possible states of A at once. Formally, the states
of An will be binary relations over A, and given a macro-state R, its range gives an exact
description of the states in A that are currently being visited simultaneously. It is safe to
think of the macro-states as subsets of A, however: the only reason that we have binary
relations over A as states rather than just subsets is to have a memory device so that we can
keep track of traces in infinite matches. For each macro-state R and each colour c we want
to be able to say that the one-step formulas corresponding to each state in the range of R
hold, so we want to translate the one-step formulas over A into one-step formulas over the
set of macro-states. In order to translate a formula ∆(a, c) to a new one-step formula with
macro-states as variables, we have to replace the variable b in ∆(a, c) with a new variable
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that acts as a stand-in for b. For this purpose we introduce a new, existentally quantified
variable zb, together with a formula stating explicitly that zb is to represent a “disjunction”
of all those macro states that contain b. Furthermore we want all the one-step formulas
to be disjunctive, and for this purpose we simply add a conjunct “Disj” to each one-step
formula, stating that the values of any pair of distinct variables appearing in the formula
are to be disjoint. Finally, in order to turn An into a parity automaton, we use a stream
automaton to detect bad traces (see for instance [34] for the details in a more specific case).
Theorem 4.20 (Simulation). Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T. For
any monotone automaton A ∈ Aut(1SOΛ) there exists an equivalent non-deterministic
A′ ∈ Aut(1SOΛ).
Fix an automaton A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω). We consider the set P(A×A) of binary relations
over A as a set of variables. Let
Disj :=
∧
R 6=R′⊆A×A
∀x.(x ⊆ R ∧ x ⊆ R′)→ Em(x)
This formula says that any two distinct relations, viewed as variables, are given disjoint
values. Note that the formula does not express the obviously contradictory condition that
any two relations R 6= R′ ⊆ A×A themselves are disjoint! Relations over A are here being
treated as formal variables, and the formula is true in any one-step model (X,α, V ) such
that V (R) ∩ V (R′) = ∅ whenever R 6= R′.
Pick a fresh variable za for each a ∈ A. Given a 1-step formula ϕ, let
ϕ[(za/a)a∈A]
be the result of substituting za for each free variable a ∈ A in ϕ. If we enumerate the
elements of A as a1, ..., ak, we now define the formula Sim(ϕ, b) for b ∈ A to be
∃za1 ...∃zak .
∧
1≤i≤k
Rep(zai , {R′ | (b, ai) ∈ R′}) ∧ ϕ[(za/a)a∈A])
where Rep(zai , {R′ | (b, ai) ∈ R′}) is the formula:
∀x.Sing(x)→ (x ⊆ zai ↔
∨
{x ⊆ R′ | (b, ai) ∈ R′})
In informal terms, the formula Rep(zai , {R′ | (b, ai) ∈ R′}) says that the variable zai
represents a disjunction of all the macro-states that contain ai. The formula Sim(ϕ, b) can
thus be thought of as reformulating the formula ϕ in terms of macro-states.
Let A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) be any monadic Λ-automaton. We can assume w.l.o.g. that A
is monotone. We first construct the automaton An = (An,∆n, a∗I , F ) with a non-parity
acceptance condition F ⊆ (An)ω as follows:
• An = P(A×A)
• ∆n(R, c) = Disj ∧
∧
b∈pi2[R] Sim(∆(b, c), b)
• a∗I = {(aI , aI)}
• F is the set of streams over P(A×A) with no bad traces.
Here, pi2 is the second projection of a relation R so that pi2[R] denotes the range of R.
A trace in a stream (R1, R2, R3, ...) over P(A × A) is a stream (a1, a2, a3, ...) over A with
a1 ∈ pi2[R1] and (aj−1, aj) ∈ Rj for j > 1. A trace is bad if the greatest number n with
Ω(ai) = n for infinitely many ai is odd.
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Proposition 4.21. The automaton An is disjunctive.
Proof. Since every formula ∆(R, c) contains the formula Disj as a conjunct, any one-step
model (X,α, V ) that satisfies ∆(R, c) must be such that V (R)∩V (R′) = ∅ whenever R 6= R′.
Clearlty, this means that each formula ∆(R, c) is disjunctive.
The following lemma is routine to check, so we leave it to the reader:
Lemma 4.22. An accepts precisely the same T-tree models as A.
Proof of Theorem 4.20. The only thing left to do at this point is to transform the automaton
An into an equivalent one that has its acceptance condition given by a parity map. We make
use of the following proposition (see [34]):
Claim 4.23. The set F of streams over P(A × A) that contain no bad traces w.r.t. the
parity map Ω is an ω-regular stream language over the alphabet P(A×A).
By Claim 4.23, there exists a deterministic parity stream automaton
Z = (Z, δ, zI ,Ωz)
that recognizes the language F , with δ : Z × P(A × A) → Z. We now construct the
automaton
An  Z = (A′n,∆′n, a′I ,Ω′n)
as follows:
• A′n = An × Z
• a′I = (a∗I , zI)
• Ω′n(R, z) = Ω(z)
• ∆′n((R, z), c) = ∆n(R, s)[((R′, δ(R, z))/R′)R′∈P(A×A)]
It is not difficult to check that An  Z is equivalent to An. Since An  Z is clearly still a
non-deterministic automaton, this ends the proof of the simulation theorem.
Combining Proposition 4.13 with Theorem 4.20, we obtain closure under existential
projection.
Proposition 4.24. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for a set functor T. Over
T-tree models, the class of second-order Λ-automata is closed under existential projection.
We can now combine the closure properties we have established for second-order automata
to give the desired translation of MSOT into second-order automata:
Theorem 4.25. For every formula ϕ ∈ MSOΛ with free variables in P , there exists a
monotone P -chromatic second-order Λ-automaton Aϕ ∈ Aut(1SOΛ) which is equivalent to ϕ
over T-tree models.
Proof. It suffices to show that every formula ϕ is equivalent to a P -chromatic Λ-automaton,
since the monotonicity constraint can then be taken care of using Proposition 4.19. We
prove the theorem by induction on the complexity of MSOΛ-formulas. We already showed
that equivalent automata are available for the atomic formulas of MSOΛ. The induction step
for disjunctions follows immediately from Proposition 4.8, since the one-step language 1SOΛ
is clearly closed under disjunctions. The induction step for negations similarly follows from
Proposition 4.10 once we check that the monotone fragment of the one-step language 1SOΛ is
closed under boolean duals (here, we are again appealing to Proposition 4.19, to ensure that
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it suffices to show that monotone second-order automata are closed under complementation).
To see this, suppose that ψ ∈ 1SOΛ(A) is a monotone one-step sentence, and suppose the free
variables of ψ are a1, ..., an ∈ A. For each ai, add a fresh variable pi, and let Comp(pi, ai) be
the formula:
∀x.(x ⊆ pi ↔ ∀y.((y ⊆ x ∧ y ⊆ ai)→ Em(y))
Informally, this formula says that pi is the complement of ai. Now, let ψ
∂ be defined as:
∃p1....∃pn.Comp(p1, a1) ∧ ... ∧ Comp(pn, an) ∧ ¬ψ[p1/a1, ..., pn/an]
Then ψ∂ is a monotone formula with free variables a1, ..., an, and its semantics in a one-step
model is indeed that of the boolean dual of ψ.
Finally, the induction step for the existential second-order quantifier is handled as follows:
suppose that A is a P -chromatic second-order automaton equivalent over T-tree models to
the formula ϕ and let p ∈ P . By Theorem 4.20, we may assume without loss of generality that
A is disjunctive. By Proposition 4.13, there is a P \ {p}-chromatic second-order automaton
∃p.A that defines the projection of A with respect to the variable p. Hence, this automaton
is equivalent to ∃p.ϕ as required.
Corollary 4.26. Suppose Λ is an expressively complete set of monotone predicate liftings
for T. Then for every formula of MSOT, there exists an equivalent second-order Λ-automaton
over T-tree models.
5. Bisimulation invariance
5.1. Uniform translations. This section continues the program of [35], making use of the
automata-theoretic translation of MSOT we have just established. The gist of our approach
is that, in order to characterize a coalgebraic fixpoint logic µMLT as the bisimulation-
invariant fragment of MSOT, it suffices to establish a certain type of translation between the
corresponding one-step languages. First we need some definitions.
Definition 5.1. Given sets X,Y , a mapping h : X → Y and a valuation V : A → Q(Y ),
we define the valuation V[h] : A→ Q(X) by setting V[h](b) = h−1(V (b)) for each b ∈ A. In
other words:
V[h] := Qh ◦ V
Note that for a pair of composable maps f, g, we have V[f◦g] = (V[g])[f ]. The most
important concept that we take from [35] is that of a uniform translation (called uniform
correspondence in [35]).
Definition 5.2. A one-step frame is a pair (X,α) with α ∈ TX. A morphism of one-step
frames h : (X ′, α′) → (X,α) is a map h : X ′ → X with Th(α′) = α. A one-step frame
(X ′, α′) together with a morphism h : (X ′, α′)→ (X,α) is called a cover of (X,α).
We can now define the notions of uniform translations and uniform constructions:
Definition 5.3. Given a functor T, a uniform construction for T is an assignment of a
cover hα : (X∗, α∗)→ (X,α) to every one-step frame (X,α).
We will usually denote the uniform construction consisting of an assignment of covers
hα : (X∗, α∗)→ (X,α) simply by (−)∗.
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Remark 5.4. A good way to think of what uniform constructions will achieve, when we use
them to obtain a characterization theorem later, is as methods to neutralize all the powers
of distinction that the second-order one-step language has over the modal one-step language
1MLΛ. Given two one-step models that cannot be distinguished by the modal one-step
language, we want to apply suitable uniform constructions to re-shape these models so that
they cannot be distinguished by the second-order one-step language either. For example, the
second-order one-step language for the powerset functor is equivalent to first-order monadic
logic with equality [36], which essentially adds to the modal one-step language the capability
of counting elements of one-step models. It is precisely this capacity for counting that is
the reason why formulas in this one-step language do not generally correspond to predicate
liftings for the powerset functor, since conditions like “having at least two elements” is clearly
not preserved by morphisms between one-step models. So we are looking for a uniform
construction that prevents making any distinctions between one-step models by counting,
and the solution is to create infinitely many copies of each element. This corresponds to the
ω-unravelling construction used by [13].
Definition 5.5. We say that a one-step language L admits uniform translations if, for any
finite set A and any finite set Γ of formulas in L(A), there exists a uniform construction
(−)∗ and a translation (−)∗ : Γ→ 1MLΛ(A) such that for any one-step model (X,α, V ) and
any ϕ ∈ Γ, we have
(X,α, V ) 1 ϕ∗ iff (X∗, α∗, V[hα]) 1 ϕ
where hα is the cover assigned to (X,α) by the construction. The pair consisting of the
translation (−)∗ and the uniform construction (−)∗ will be referred to as a uniform translation
for the set of formulas Γ.
As an example, consider the disjunctive formulas introduced by Walukiewicz,
Definition 5.6. Given a P -chromatic second-order automaton A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) and a
uniform translation for the finite set ∆[A×P(P )], we get a corresponding modal automaton
A∗ = (A,∆∗, aI ,Ω), with ∆∗ given by ∆∗(a, c) := (∆(a, c))∗. We overload the notation (·)∗
to refer both to a uniform one-step translation and the induced translation at the level of
automata.
The proof of the following result closely follows that of the main result in [35]. The only
difference with [35] is that here we need an “unravelling”-like component, in order to turn
an arbitrary model into a tree-like one.
Proposition 5.7. Assume that 1SOΛ admits uniform translations, and let A be a second-
order Λ-automaton. Then for each pointed T-model (S, s) there is a T-tree model (T, R, t),
with a T-model morphism f from T to S, mapping t to s, and such that
A accepts (T, R, t) iff A∗ accepts (S, s).
Proof. Consider any given pointed T-model (S1, s1) where S1 = (S1, σ1, V1). We are going
to construct a T-tree model (S2, R, s2), S2 = (S2, σ2, V2), together with a model morphism
from the underlying pointed T-model S2 to S1 mapping s2 to s1, and such that A accepts
the T-tree model (S2, s2) if and only if A∗ accepts the pointed T-model (S1, s1).
We construct this T-tree model as follows: for each u ∈ S1, we define an associated pair
(Xu, αu) by setting (Xu, αu) = ((S1)∗, σ1(u)∗). Observe that, by the construction of these
one-step models, for each u ∈ S1, there is a mapping ξu : Xu → S1 such that:
(1) T(ξu)(αu) = σ1(u)
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(2) For each valuation U : A → Q(S1), every u ∈ S1 and every one-step formula ∆(a, c)
appearing in A, we have
(S1, σ1(u), U) 1 ∆∗(a, c) iff (Xu, αu, U[ξu]) 1 ∆(a, c)
The map ξu is given by hσ1(u). We now construct the T-tree model (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2) as
follows: first, consider the set of all non-empty finite (non-empty) tuples (v1, ..., vn) of
elements in
{s1} ∪
⋃
u∈S1
Xu
such that v1 = s1. We define, by induction, for each natural number n > 0 a subset Mn of
this set, and a mapping γn : Mn → S1, as follows:
• Set M1 = {(s1)}, and define γ1(s1) = s1.
• Set Mn+1 = {~vw | ~v ∈Mn, w ∈ Xγn(~v)}. Define γn+1(~vw) = ξγn(~v)(w).
Here, we write ~vw to denote the tuple (v1, ..., vn, w) if ~v = (v1, ..., vn). Set S2 =
⋃
n>0Mn,
and define γ =
⋃
n>0 γn. Define the relation R ⊆ S2 × S2 to be
{(~v,~vw) | ~v ∈ S2, w ∈ Xγ(~v)}
Note that there is, for every ~v ∈ S2, a bijection i~v : Xγ(~v) → R(~v) given by w 7→ ~vw. Note
also that, for each ~v ∈ S2, we have
γ ◦ ιR(~v),S2 ◦ i~v = ξγ(~v)
With this in mind, we define the coalgebra structure σ2 by setting
σ2(~v) = T(ιR(~v),S2 ◦ i~v)(αγ(~v))
Note that σ2(~v)|R(~v) = Ti~v(αγ(~v)). Finally, set s2 to be the unique singleton tuple with sole
element s1, and define the valuation V2 by setting V
†
2 (~v) = V
†
1 (γ(~v)).
Clearly, (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2) is a T-tree model. Denote the underlying T-model by S2. We
can then prove the following two claims:
Claim 5.8. The map γ is a T-model morphism from S2 to S1.
Proof of Claim 5.8. The map γ clearly respects the truth values of all propositional atoms,
and γ(s2) = s1. It suffices to show that γ is a coalgebra morphism, i.e. that Tγ(σ2(~v)) =
σ1(γ(~v)) for all ~v. Pick any ~v ∈ S2. We have:
Tγ(σ2(~v)) = Tγ ◦ TιR(~v),S2 ◦ T(i~v)(αγ(~v))
= T(γ ◦ ιR(~v),S2 ◦ i~v)(αγ(~v))
= T(ξγ(~v))(αγ(~v))
= σ1(γ(~v))
as required.
Claim 5.9. A accepts (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2) iff A∗ accepts S1.
Proof of Claim 5.9: We have two parts that need to be proved here:
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First part: A accepts (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2) implies A∗ accepts (S1, s1). Suppose that χ is a
(positional) winning strategy in the acceptance game for A and (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2). We are
going to define a strategy χ∗ for ∃ in the acceptance game for A∗ and S1, with the property
that for any χ∗-guided partial match
ρ = (a1, s
1
1), ..., (an, s
1
n)
of length n with sii ∈ S1 and s11 = s1, there exists a χ-guided partial match
ρ∗ = (a1, s21), ..., (an, s
2
n)
with s2i ∈ S2, s21 = s2 and γ(s2i ) = s1i for each index i, and chosen in such a way that if a
χ∗-guided match ρ′ is an extension of ρ, then the χ-guided match ρ′∗ is an extension of the
χ-guided match ρ∗.
We define the strategy χ∗ by induction on the length of a partial match. For the partial
match ρ consisting of the single position (aI , s
1
1) we let ρ∗ consist of the single position
(aI , s2), and we define the valuation χ
∗(ρ) : A→ Q(S1) by setting, for each b ∈ A,
χ∗(ρ)(b) = γ[χ(aI , s2)(b)]
Similarly, suppose that χ∗ has been defined for all matches of length less than n, and let ρ
be any match of length n > 1. If ρ is not χ∗-guided, then we can define χ∗(ρ)(b) = ∅ for all
b ∈ A. If ρ is χ∗-guided, then write
ρ = (a1, s
1
1), ...., (an, s
1
n)
Since this match is χ∗-guided, by the induction hypothesis there is a χ-guided partial match
ρ∗ = (a1, s21), ..., (an, s
2
n)
with γ(s2i ) = s
1
i for all i. We set, for each b ∈ A,
χ∗(ρ)(b) = γ[χ(an, s2n)(b)]
Clearly, with this definition, the induction hypothesis continues to hold for all χ∗-guided
matches of length n+ 1. Furthermore, we note that, whenever ρ is a χ∗-guided match of
length n, the move χ∗(ρ) is legal: since the move χ(an, s2n) must be legal, we have
(R(s2n), σ2(s
2
n)|R(s2n), χ(an, s2n)) 1 ∆(an, V
†
2 (s
2
n))
But since
σ2(s
2
n)|R(s2n) = Tis2n(αγ(s2n)) = Tis2n(αs1n)
we see that is2n is an isomorphism between the one-step models (R[s
2
n], σ2(s
2
n)|R(s2n), χ(an, s2n))
and (Xs1n , αs1n , χ(an, s
2
n)[is2n ]
), so we have
(Xs1n , αs1n , χ(an, s
2
n)[is2n ]
) 1 ∆(an, V †2 (s2n))
For all b ∈ A, we have
χ(an, s
2
n)[is2n ]
(b) ⊆ ξ−1
s2n
(ξs2n [χ(an, s
2
n)[is2n ]
(b)])
= ξ−1
s2n
(γ[χ(an, s
2
n)(b)])
= ξ−1
s2n
(χ∗(ρ)(b))
= χ∗(ρ)[ξ
(s2n)
](b)
So by monotonicity we get
(Xs1n , αs2n , χ
∗(ρ)[ξ
s2n
]) 1 ∆(an, V †2 (s2n))
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Hence, since ∆∗(an, V
†
2 (s
2
n)) is the uniform translation of ∆(an, V
†
2 (s
2
n)), we get
(S1, σ1(s
2
n), χ
∗(ρ)) 1 ∆∗(an, V †2 (s2n))
as required. It is now easy to show that ∃ never gets stuck in a χ∗-guided partial match,
and we also see that every infinite χ∗-guided match
(aI , s
1
1), (a2, s
1
2), (a3, s
1
3), ...
corresponds to an infinite χ-guided match
(aI , s
2
1), (a2, s
2
2), (a3, s
2
3), ...
and so since ∃ wins every infinite χ-guided match, she wins every infinite χ∗-guided match
as well.
Second part: A∗ accepts (S1, s1) implies A accepts (S2, R, σ2, s2, V2). Let χ∗ be a winning
strategy for ∃ in the acceptance game for A∗ and S1. We define the strategy χ as follows:
given a partial match
ρ = (a1, s
2
1), ..., (an, s
2
n)
set χ(ρ) = χ∗(γ(ρ))[γ], where γ(ρ) is the match
(a1, γ(s
2
1)), ..., (an, γ(s
2
n))
It is straightforward to check that, whenever ρ is a χ-guided match, γ(ρ) is a χ∗-guided
match, and that the move χ∗(γ(ρ)) is legal if and only if the move χ(ρ) is legal. It follows
that ∃ never gets stuck in a χ-guided partial match, and that she wins every infinite χ-guided
match, since an infinite χ-guided match
(aI , s
2
1), (a2, s
2
2), (a3, s
2
3), ...
corresponds to an infinite χ∗-guided match
(aI , γ(s
2
1)), (a2, γ(s
2
2)), (a3, γ(s
2
3)), ...
This concludes the proof.
The lemma now follows by combining the two claims 5.8 and 5.9.
From this, we get the following result. Here, we use the fact that every MSOΛ-formula is
equivalent to a monotone second-order automaton over T-tree models, so that it suffices to
find translations of monotone one-step formulas.
Theorem 5.10 (Auxiliary Characterization Theorem). Let Λ be an expressively complete set
of monotone predicate liftings for a set functor T, and assume that the monotone fragment
of the one-step language 1SOΛ admits uniform translations. Then:
MSOΛ/∼ ≡ µMLΛ
Proof. Given a bisimulation invariant formula ϕ of MSOΛ, let A be an equivalent monotone
second-order automaton, and suppose there is a uniform translation (−)∗ of the monotone
fragment of the one-step language 1SOΛ. Let ψ be a formula in µMLΛ equivalent to the
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automaton A∗. Then for any pointed T-model S, s, let (T, R, t) be the T-tree model provided
by Proposition 5.7. Then we get:
S, s  ϕ ⇔ T, t  ϕ
⇔ T, R, t  A
⇔ S, s  A∗
⇔ S, s  ψ
and the proof is done.
5.2. Adequate uniform constructions. The existence of uniform translations for the
one-step language [35] involves two components: a translation on the syntactic side and
a uniform construction on the semantic side. One of our main new observations in this
paper is that we can actually forget about the syntactic translation and focus entirely on
the model-theoretic side of the construction. If we can find a suitable uniform construction
for the one-step models, satisfying a certain model-theoretic condition with respect to the
second-order one-step language, the syntactic translation will come for free.
Definition 5.11. Let ϕ be any one-step formula in 1SOΛ(A). Then a uniform construction
(−)∗ for T is called adequate for ϕ if, for any pair of one-step frames (X,α) and (Y, β), any
one-step frame morphism f : (X,α)→ (Y, β) and any valuation V : A→ Q(Y ), we have the
following condition (?):
(X∗, α∗, V[f◦hα]) 1 ϕ iff (Y∗, β∗, V[hβ ]) 1 ϕ
where hα : (X∗, α∗)→ (X,α) and hβ : (Y∗, β∗)→ (Y, β) are the covering maps given by the
uniform construction. We say that the construction is adequate for a set of formulas Γ if it
is adequate for every member of Γ.
The following diagram clarifies condition (?):
(X∗, α∗, V[f◦hα])
(X,α, V[f ])
(Y∗, β∗, V[hβ ])
(Y, β, V )
ϕ⇐⇒
f
//
hα

hβ

We are now ready to prove our first main theorem, stating that if T admits an adequate
construction for any finite set of one-step formulas, then MSOT/∼ ≡ µMLT.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. By Theorem 5.10 it suffices to show that the monotone fragment of
1SOT admits uniform translations. Let Γ be a finite set of monotone formulas of 1SOT(A),
for some finite set A, and suppose the uniform construction (−)∗ is adequate for Γ. Given
ϕ ∈ Γ we define a monotone predicate lifting λ over A by setting
α ∈ λX(V ) iff (X∗, α∗, V[hα]) 1 ϕ.
It is easy to check that this lifting is monotone, and naturality of λ is a direct consequence
of the condition (?). If A has n elements and we list these as (a1, ..., an), then we can view
λ as a formula in 1MLΛ(A) of the form λ
′(a1, ..., an), where λ′ is the n-place predicate lifting
corresponding to λ with this given ordering of A. We now get a uniform translation by
mapping ϕ to the formula λ′(a1, ..., an).
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Note that, if Λ is an expressively complete set of liftings for T, then it suffices to find
an adequate uniform construction for every finite set of formulas in 1SOΛ(A), since every
formula in 1SOT(A) is semantically equivalent to one in 1SOΛ(A). Hence, by Theorem 5.10
we get:
Corollary 5.12. Let T be any set functor, and let Λ be an expressively complete set of
predicate liftings for T. If T admits an adequate uniform construction for every finite set of
formulas of 1SOΛ, then
MSOΛ/∼ ≡ µMLΛ.
If T preserves weak pullbacks then we can reformulate (?) as the following condition:
Definition 5.13. Suppose T preserves weak pullbacks. A one-step T-bisimulation between
one-step models (X,α, V ) and (Y, β, U) is a relation R ⊆ X × Y such that:
• If xRy then V †(x) = U †(y).
• (α, β) ∈ TR.
Proposition 5.14. Suppose that T preserves weak pullbacks, and let (−)∗ be a uniform
construction for T. Then (−)∗ is adequate for ϕ if, and only if, for every pair of one-step
T-bisimilar one-step models (X,α, V ) and (Y, β, U) we have:
(X∗, α∗, V[hα]) 1 ϕ⇔ (Y∗, β∗, U[hβ ]) 1 ϕ.
5.3. Some easy applications. We now start with some straightforward applications of
the main characterization theorem.
Example 5.15. As a first application, the standard Janin-Walukiewicz characterization of
the modal µ-calculus can be seen as an instance of the first main characterization result by
taking Λ = {♦} and T = P, recalling that MSO = MSO{♦}. The uniform construction for P,
which is adequate with respect to any set of one-step formulas, is given as follows: consider
a pair (X,α) with α ∈ P(X). We take this to X∗ = α∗ = α× ω, and we let hα : α× ω → X
be the projection map. Proving adequacy of this construction is an exercise in model theory,
and left to the reader. (The proof is a much simpler special case of the argument we will
use in Section 6.2.)
Example 5.16. Consider the finitary multiset (“bags”) functor B, which sends a set X to
the set of mappings f : X → ω such that the set {u ∈ X | f(u) = 0} is cofinite. The action
on morphisms is given by letting, for f ∈ BX and h : X → Y , the multiset Bh(f) : Y → ω
be defined by w 7→∑h(v)=w f(v). Given a pair X,α where α : X → ω has finite support,
we define
X∗ =
⋃
{{u} × α(u) | u ∈ X}.
Here, we follow the standard procedure and identify each finite ordinal n ∈ ω with the set
of smaller ordinals, so that 0 is identified with ∅, 1 is {∅}, 2 is {∅, {∅}} and so on. The
mapping α∗ : X∗ → ω is defined by setting α∗(w) = 1 for all w ∈ X∗. The map hα : X∗ → X
is defined by (u, i) 7→ u. It is easy to check that whenever two one-step frames (X,α)
and (Y, β) are related by some morphism f : (X,α) → (Y, β), the models (X∗, α∗, V[f◦hα])
and (Y∗, β∗, V[hβ ]) are isomorphic, for any valuation V : A → Q(Y ). It follows that the
construction is adequate for any set of one-step formulas, hence we get µMLB ≡ MSOB/∼.
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Example 5.17. Consider the set of all exponential polynomial functors [12] defined by the
“grammar”:
T ::= C | Id | T× T |
∐
i∈I
Ti | TC
where C is any constant functor for some set C, and Id is the identity functor on Set. These
functors cover many important applications: streams, binary trees, deterministic finite
automata and deterministic labelled transition systems are all examples of coalgebras for
exponential polynomial functors, as is the so called game functor whose coalgebras provide
semantics for Coalition Logic [5]. For this last instance, the “game functor” G for n agents
can be written in the form of an exponential polynomial functor as follows:∐
〈S0,...,Sn−1〉∈(P(ω)\{∅})n
{〈S0, ..., Sn−1〉} × Id(S0×...×Sn−1)
Then, for a given set X, an element of GX will be a pair consisting of a vector 〈S0, ..., Sn−1〉
of available strategies for each player, together with an “outcome map” f assigning an
element of X to each strategy profile in S0 × ...× Sn−1.
Every exponential polynomial functor admits adequate uniform constructions for all
sets of one-step formulas. The proof proceeds by a straighforward induction, and similarly
to the case for the bags functor it provides each exponential polynomial functor T with a
uniform construction such that for any one-step frame morphism f : (X,α)→ (Y, β) and
any V : A→ Q(Y ), the one-step models (X∗, α∗, V[f◦hα]) and (Y∗, β∗, V[hβ ]) are isomorphic.
Hence, we get:
Theorem 5.18. For every exponential polynomial functor T, we have µMLT ≡ MSOT/∼.
Proof. We provide a sketch of the inductive construction of an adequate uniform construction.
Constant functor. For the constant functor C, a one-step frame is a pair (X, c) with c ∈ C.
We set X∗ = ∅, c∗ = c and hc : ∅ → X to be the unique inclusion of the empty set.
Identity functor. Given a one-step frame (X,u) for the identity functor, which consists of a
set X and u ∈ X, we set X∗ = {u}, u∗ = u and we set hu : {u} → X to be the inclusion
map sending u to itself.
Product. Suppose that T1 and T2 have associated adequate uniform constructions with
the required property. Consider a one-step T1 × T2-frame (X, (α, β)) with α ∈ T1X and
β ∈ T2X. Let h1 : (X1, α1)→ (X,α) be the cover assigned by the uniform construction for
T1 and let h2 : (X2, β2)→ (X,β) be the cover assigned by the uniform construction for T2.
Then we take X∗ to be the disjoint union X1 +X2, and set
(α, β)∗ = (T1i1(α1),T2i2(β2))
where i1 : X1 → X1 +X2 and i2 : X2 → X1 +X2 are the insertion maps for the co-product.
Finally, we define the covering map h(α,β) : X1 +X2 → X be obtained by simply co-tupling
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the maps h1, h2, i.e. h(α,β) is the map given by the universal property of the co-product
applied to the diagram X1
h1−→ X h2←− X2. We get:
(T1 × T2)h(α,β)((α, β)∗) = (T1h(α,β)(T1i1(α1)),T2h(α,β)(T2i2(β2)))
= (T1(h(α,β) ◦ i1)(α1),T2(h(α,β) ◦ i2)(β2))
= (T1h1(α1),T2h2(β2))
= (α, β)
so h(α,β) is indeed a covering map as required.
Exponentiation. The case of a functor TC for some constant C is handled analogously with
the case of binary products, so we leave it to the reader.
Co-product. This step of the construction is actually the easiest one. Suppose that each
functor Ti for i ∈ I is equipped with an adequation uniform construction, in the strong
sense demanded by our induction hypothesis. Without loss of generality let’s assume that
TiX ∩ TjX = ∅ for i 6= j. Let (X,α) be a one-step frame for the co-product
∐
i∈I Ti. Then
there is a unique i ∈ I with α ∈ TiX, and so we define the cover hα : (X∗, α∗) → (X,α)
merely by applying the uniform construction for Ti.
Remark 5.19. These uniform constructions were all designed in a case-by-case fashion,
and at the present time we do not know whether there is any general recipe for producing an
adequate uniform construction when it exists. What the constructions mentioned so far seem
to have in common is that we want to produce as many equivalent (in some sense) copies of
each state in a one-step model, but this is not always sufficient. In the next section we will
see a somewhat more involved construction for the monotone mu-calculus, which aims to
create sufficiently many copies of each state but also, crucially, sufficiently many pairwise
disjoint copies of all the neighborhoods. In this case we are trying to neutralize not only the
capability of the second-order one-step language to count states in one-step models, but also
its capability to express how certain neighborhoods are related to each other, in particular,
whether they overlap or not. For example, the second-order one-step language can express
the property that any two neighborhoods intersect, or there is a smallest neighborhood
contained in all others etc., and the uniform construction we provide needs to trivialize
all such statements. In general, applying our main result as it stands may require a bit of
creativity, and we regard it as an interesting (possibly quite hard) task for future research
to come up with a result that makes the task entirely mechanical. We mention some related
questions in our concluding remarks section.
6. Characterizing the monotone µ-calculus
This final section of the paper concerns the monotone neighborhood functor M. There
are two main difficulties here. First, the uniform construction will be less straightforward
than in the previous applications, for the reasons that we explained above. Second, we
need to do a bit of “pre-processing” of the monotone neighborhood functor to make the
technique of uniform constructions applicable. In fact, the characterization theorem cannot
possibly apply directly to the monotone µ-calculus: it turns out that there is no adequate
uniform construction for M. For these reasons, we view the results of this section as an
EXPRESSIVE COMPLETENESS FOR COALGEBRAIC µ-CALCULI 37
independent contribution of the paper, rather than just another application to illustrate the
main theorem.
Proposition 6.1. The functor M does not admit an adequate uniform construction for the
formula ϕ defined as: ¬Em(a).
Proof. The formula ϕ just says that the value of a is non-empty. Suppose there existed
an adequate uniform construction for this formula. Consider the situation depicted in
the diagram below, which shows three one-step frames together with two one-step frame
morphisms, one for each of the two bottom one-step frames. The top frame consists of two
points {w1, w2} and has neighborhoods {{w1, w2}, {w2}}, the bottom left frame has points
{u1, u2, u3} and neighborhoods {{u1, u2}, {u2, u3}, {u1, u2, u3}}. Finally the bottom right
frame has a single point {v} and this singleton as its only neighborhood. In other words, the
picture shows a co-span in the category of one-step frames and one-step frame morphisms.
Furthermore, consider the valuation on the topmost one-step frame which makes a true at
exactly the one state w1, i.e. the one not belonging to the singleton neighborhood. This
valuation is depicted in the diagram by representing the state where a is true by a blank
circle, and the state where it is not true by a filled circle. The induced valuations on the
bottom one-step frames via the frame morphisms are depicted in the same manner. With
respect to these valuations, p will be true at u1, but false at u2, u3 and v.
Every cover satisfies ϕ
No cover satisfies ϕ
Let us denote the top frame by (Y, β), its valuation by V , the bottom-left frame as (X,α), the
bottom-right one as (X ′, α′) and the corresponding frame morphisms as f and f ′ respectively.
Now, the supposed adequate construction will assign a cover to each of the three frames,
and we get valuations for each cover from the valuations depicted in the diagram. It follows
from the defining condition (?) for adequacy that ϕ must have the same truth value in each
of these covers. But this leads to a contradiction: it is not hard to check that the cover
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hα : (X∗, α∗) → (X,α) must be such that (X∗, α∗, V[f◦hα])  ϕ, because the image of the
map hα must support α and therefore include the one element of X coloured red. On the
other hand, we clearly must have (X ′∗, α′∗, V[f ′◦hα′ ]) 2 ϕ, which contradicts the condition
(?).
6.1. The supported companion of a functor. Our solution to the problem we are
facing with the monotone neighborhood functor is to perform a gentle repair, changing the
functor into a closely related one that does admit an adequate uniform construction. The
construction has some independent interest from a general coalgebraic perspective, so we
define it in general terms:
Definition 6.2. The supported companion T of a set functor T is the sub-functor of P × T
defined by:
T(X) = {(Z,α) | α ∈ TX & Z supports α}
It is easy to check that this is indeed a well-defined subfunctor of P × T, since for any
map f : X → Y , any α ∈ TX and any set Z ⊆ X, the image f [Z] = Pf(Z) is a support
for Tf(α) whenever Z is a support for α. The reader may also note that what we have
called “T-tree models” are actually special instances of T-models, so in a sense the supported
companion functor has already played a role in the proof of the main theorem. We will show
that this construction repairs the monotone neighborhood functor, so that the supported
companion M of M admits an adequate uniform construction. Interestingly enough, the
same construction happens to repair weak pullback preservation:
Proposition 6.3. The functor M preserves weak pullbacks.
We leave the verification of this to the reader; the argument is similar to the reasoning
in [20] used to establish the existence of a well-behaved relation lifting for M.
Note that we have an obvious natural transformation pi : T→ P with components given
by the projection maps sending (Z,α) ∈ TX to Z ∈ P(X), and we can compose this with
the predicate lifting  : Q → Q ◦ P to obtain a predicate lifting  for T defined by:
 := Qpi ◦
We call this lifting the support modality for T, and write its dual as ♦. Furthermore, any
lifting λ for T corresponds to a lifting for T by composing λ with the projection from T to
T in the same manner, and we will not take care to distinguish λ as a lifting for T from the
corresponding lifting for T. A little issue that we need to address, before we can proceed to
characterize the monotone µ-calculus, is just how the language µMLΛ is related to µMLΛ∪{}
for a given set of liftings Λ for T. The rest of this subsection will provide the answer, and give
a characterization theorem for µMLΛ as the T-bisimulation invariant fragment of µMLΛ∪{},
where a formula is said to be T-bisimulation invariant if it has the same truth value in any
two pointed T-models for which the corresponding T-models are behaviourally equivalent.
Formally we shall write (S, s) ∼ (S′, s′), for T-models S and S′, to say that the respective
underlying pointed T-models are behaviourally equivalent. To distinguish this from actual
behavioural equivalence in the sense of the companion functor T, we write (S, s) ∼ (S′, s′) to
say that these pointed models are behaviourally equivalent as T-models.
We borrow a result from [8]:
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Fact 6.4 ([8]). For any set of liftings Λ for any set functor T, the logic µMLΛ has the finite
model property.
We assume that we have at our disposal a fixed T-model U = (U, γ, V ) which is a disjoint
union of one isomorphic copy for every finite pointed T-model (S, s). It is not hard to see
that such a model does exist: just take a disjoint union containing each T-model defined on
some finite subset n = {0, ..., n− 1} of ω. Since the class of all these models clearly forms a
set, their disjoint union is a well defined T-model.
Definition 6.5. Let S be any finite T-model. We define the model S⊕U = (S +U, σ+, V+)
such that, for each s ∈ S we have
σ+(s) = (S + U,T(ιS,S+U )(α))
where σ(s) = (X,α), and for u ∈ U we have σ+(u) = TιU,S+U (γ(u))5.
Note that the underlying T-model of S ⊕ U is just the co-product of the underlying
T-models of S and U respectively.
The following lemmas are immediate from the definition.
Lemma 6.6. Let S be any T-model. Then for all u ∈ U , we have:
(U, u) ∼ (S⊕ U, u)
Lemma 6.7. For any T-model S and s ∈ S: (S, s) ∼ (S⊕ U, s).
Note that Lemma 6.7 is not guaranteed to hold if we replace ∼ by the finer equivalence
relation ∼.
It will be convenient in this section to work with a second version of the acceptance
game for a modal Λ-automaton or a modal Λ ∪ {}-automaton, which we will call the
extended acceptance game for A with respect to a model S, denoted E(A,S). Given a modal Λ-
automaton A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) and a model S = (S, σ, V ) this game has three types of positions:
pairs of the form (ψ, s) with ψ ∈ 1MLΛ(A), pairs of the form (ψ, s) with ψ ∈ Latt(A) (lattice
formulas over A, as defined in Definition 3.11), and maps f : Latt(A)→ P(S). Admissible
moves are given in Table 4:
Position Player Admissible moves Priority
(ψ1 ∨ ψ2, s) ∃ {(ψ1, s), (ψ2, s)} 0
(ψ1 ∧ ψ2, s) ∀ {(ψ1, s), (ψ2, s)} 0
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {(∆(a, V †(s)), s)} Ω(a)
(λ(ψ1, ..., ψn), s) ∃ {f : Latt(A)→ PS | σ(s) ∈ λ(f(ψ1), ..., f(ψn))} 0
(>, s) ∀ ∅ 0
(⊥, s) ∃ ∅ 0
f : Latt(A)→ P(S) ∀ {(ψ, s) | s ∈ f(ψ)} 0
Table 4: The extended acceptance game
Here, λ ∈ Λ∪ {}. It is easy to see that the position (>, s) is always winning for ∃, and
(⊥, s) is always winning for ∀. The following result is entirely routine to prove:
5In this definition we have used “+” as the symbol for binary coproducts of sets.
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Theorem 6.8. Let A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) be a modal Λ-automaton and (S, s) a pointed T-model.
Then A accepts (S, s) if, and only if, (aI , s) is a winning position in the extended acceptance
game.
We also have the following observation:
Proposition 6.9. Let ψ be any one-step formula in 1MLΛ(A) for a set of liftings Λ for some
given set functor T, and let P ∈ {∀, ∃}. If (S, s) ∼ (S′, s′) then the position (ψ, s) is winning
for P in E(A, S) if and only if (ψ, s′) is a winning position for P in E(A,S′).
This means that for a pair of T-models S and S′ such that (S, s) ∼ (S′, s′), and a formula
ψ ∈ ML1Λ∪{}(A), the position (ψ, s) is winning for P in E(A,S) if and only if (ψ, s′) is a
winning position for P in E(A, S′).
Definition 6.10. Let A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω) be a Λ ∪ {}-automaton and let ψ be a formula
in the range of ∆. We say that ψ is A-valid if for all (finite) pointed T-models (S, s), the
position (ψ, s) is winning in E(A,S). We say that ψ is A-satisfiable if there is some (finite)
pointed T-model (S, s), the position (ψ, s) is winning in E(A, S).
Let Λ be any set of predicate liftings for T and let A be any modal Λ ∪ {}-automaton.
Making use of our fixed T-model U we shall define a translation tA : 1MLΛ∪{}(A)→ 1MLΛ(A)
by induction as follows:
• For λ ∈ Λ, we set tA(λ(ψ1, ..., ψk)) = λ(ψ1, ..., ψk), and similarly for the dual λd for every
lifting λ ∈ Λ.
• tA(>) = > and tA(⊥) = ⊥.
• tA(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) = tA(ψ1) ∨ tA(ψ2) and tA(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) = tA(ψ1) ∧ tA(ψ2).
• tA(ψ) =
{ > if ψ is A-valid
⊥ otherwise
}
.
• tA(♦ψ) =
{ > if ψ is A-satisfiable
⊥ otherwise
}
.
Note that this translation depends on the whole automaton A, not just the set of variables
A. So for any given set of variables A, we have one translation tA : 1MLΛ∪{}(A)→ 1MLΛ(A)
for each automaton A with states A, and the translations will generally be different for
different choices of A. However, we will drop the index A from now on to simplify notation.
Given a modal Λ ∪ {}-automaton A = (A,∆, aI ,Ω), we will write t(A) for the automaton
(A,∆t, aI ,Ω) where ∆
t is defined by ∆t(a, c) = t(∆(a, c)), where it is understood that t
denotes the translation tA. Clearly t(A) is a modal Λ-automaton.
We shall view the translation t as a map defined on the entire domain 1MLΛ∪{}(A) ∪
Latt(A) by setting t(ψ) = ψ for ψ ∈ Latt(A).
Lemma 6.11. For every finite pointed model (S, s), and for any modal Λ ∪ {}-automaton
A, we have
(S, s)  t(A) iff (S⊕ U, s)  A
Proof. For left to right, suppose that (S, s)  t(A). By Theorem 6.8 there is a strategy χ for
∃ in the extended acceptance game for t(A) and S which is winning at (aI , s). Without loss
of generality we may assume that χ is positional, and a winning strategy at every winning
position in E(t(A),S). Our goal is to construct a positional strategy χ′ for ∃ in the extended
acceptance game for A and S ⊕ U, which prescribes a move for ∃ at every position (ψ, v)
belonging to ∃ and with v ∈ S, such that:
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(1) χ′ assigns a legitimate move to every position belonging to ∃ of the form (ψ, v) with
v ∈ S such that (t(ψ), v) is a winning position in E(t(A),S),
(2) every χ′-guided partial match ρ starting at (aI , s) and ending with a position (ψ, v)
satisfies one of the following two criteria:
a: v ∈ S and t[ρ] is a χ-guided match in E(t(A), S) (hence consists only of winning
positions for ∃).
b: (ψ, v) is a winning position in E(A, S⊕ U).
Here, given that ρ = pi1....pin, we define t[ρ] = t(pi1)....t(pin) where t(ψ, v) = (t(ψ), v) if
ψ ∈ 1MLΛ(A) ∪ Latt(A), and t(f) = f for a position f : Latt(A)→ P(S). Clearly, we can
build a winning strategy in E(A,S⊕ U) from such a strategy χ′.
We define the strategy χ′ by a case distinction, given a position (ψ, v) belonging to ∃
with v ∈ S. If ψ = α1 ∨ α2 then t(ψ) = t(α1) ∨ t(α2), so we set χ′(ψ, v) = (αi, v) where
i is chosen so that χ(t(ψ), v) = (t(αi), v). If ψ = λ(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) then t(ψ) = λ(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)
too, so we set χ′(ψ, v) = χ(t(ψ), v). A simple naturality argument shows that this is still a
legitimate move in E(A,S⊕ U).
Finally, the interesting case is the one involving the support modality: at a position
(♦ϕ, v), if (t(♦ϕ), v) is winning for ∃ in E(A, S) then we must have t(♦ϕ) = >, hence ϕ is
A-satisfiable. Hence, by the construction of U, and by Observation 6.9 there is some u ∈ U
such that (ϕ, u) is winning for ∃ in E(A,S⊕ U). So we let the strategy χ′ pick the position
(ϕ, u). For the case involving the dual , if t(ϕ) = > then ϕ is valid, and we can let ∃
pick the map sending ϕ to S + U .
We also need to check that every χ′-guided partial match satisfies one of the conditions
(a) or (b), and we prove this by an induction on the length of a partial match. The only
interesting case is for the extension of a partial match ρ ending with a position (ϕ, v). By
the induction hypothesis on ρ, we have v ∈ S and (t(ϕ), v) is winning for ∃, hence we must
have t(ϕ) = >. This means that ϕ is A-valid, so any move (ϕ,w) by ∀ answering the move
S + U by ∃ will satisfy the condition (b), i.e. (ϕ,w) is winning for ∃ in E(A,S⊕ U).
For right to left, suppose that ∃ has a winning strategy χ at the position (aI , s) in
the extended acceptance game for A with respect to S ⊕ U. We shall give ∃ a winning
strategy χ′ at the same position in the game for t(A) with respect to S. We shall inductively
associate with every χ′-guided partial match pi of length k a χ-guided “shadow match”
(ψ1, v1), ..., (ψk, vk) such that pi is of the form
(t(ψ1), v1), ...., (t(ψk), vk).
We shall also make sure that whenever pi′ is an extension of pi, the shadow match associated
with pi′ is an extension of the shadow match associated with pi as well. It will clearly follow
that ∃ wins every infinite χ′-guided match.
For the singleton match consisting of (aI , s) we let (aI , s) itself be the shadow match.
(This is acceptable because, by convention, we have set t(aI) = aI .) For a match pi of length
k we define the move χ′(pi) depending on the shape of the last position on the associated
shadow match. Again we treat only the interesting cases.
If the last position on the shadow match is (λ(ψ1, ..., ψm), v) then χ provides a map
f : Latt(A)→ Q(S + U) such that
σ+(v) ∈ λS+U (f(ψ1), ..., f(ψm)).
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We set χ′(pi) = f ′, where f ′ : Latt(A) → Q(S) is defined by θ 7→ f(θ) ∩ S for each
θ ∈ Latt(A). This move is legal since v ∈ S and by naturality of λ. It is easy to see how to
extend the shadow match for each response by ∀.
If the last position on the shadow match is (ψ, v) then since this position is winning
for ∃, it must be the case that every position (ψ,w) for w ∈ S + U is winning for ∃, hence
this holds for every w ∈ U . This can only be true if ψ is A-valid and so we have t(ψ) = >.
This means we are done since (>, v) is a winning position for ∃. Similarly, if the last position
on the shadow match is (♦ψ, v), then there is some w ∈ S + U such that (ψ,w) is winning
for ∃, so ψ is A-satisfiable. Hence t(♦ψ) = >, and the conclusion follows as in the previous
case.
We can now prove our characterization theorem:
Theorem 6.12. Let T be any set functor and let Λ be any set of predicate liftings for T.
Then:
µMLΛ∪{}/∼ ≡ µMLΛ.
Proof. Suppose a formula ϕ of µMLΛ∪{} is invariant for T-bisimilation. By the finite model
property for µMLΛ∪{} it suffices to show that ϕ is equivalent to a µMLΛ-formula over finite
models. Let A be a modal Λ ∪ {}-automaton equivalent to ϕ, and let ψ be a formula of
µMLΛ equivalent to the automaton t(A). Consider an arbitrary finite pointed T-model (S, s).
We have:
(S, s)  ϕ ⇔ (S⊕ U, s)  ϕ (Lemma 6.7 + assumption on ϕ)
⇔ (S⊕ U, s)  A
⇔ (S, s)  t(A) (Lemma 6.11)
⇔ (S, s)  ψ
as required.
6.2. An adequate uniform construction forM. In this section we shall apply Corollary
5.12 to derive a characterization result for the monotone µ-calculus. The first fact that we
need is the following:
Proposition 6.13. The set of liftings {,} is expressively complete with respect to M.
Proof. Since M preserves weak pullbacks, it suffices by Proposition 3.18 to show that the
one-step language 1ML{,} has the same expressive power as the language based on the
Moss liftings for M. Given a finite set A, a subset Γ ⊆ Latt(A) and some N ∈MLatt(A)
that is supported by Γ, we want to define a formula γ in 1ML{,} such that
X, (X ′, α), V 1 γ iff ((X ′, α), (Γ, N)) ∈ (M)(0V )
This formula can be obtained as a conjunction θΓ ∧ θN , where θΓ is like the standard
nabla-formula for the powerset functor corresponding to Γ, but expressed in terms of the
support modality, and θN is defined as the nabla formulas for the monotone neighborhood
functor introduced by Santocanale and Venema in [30]. We omit the details.
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The remainder of this section is devoted to defining a uniform construction for the
supported companion M of M w.r.t. a given finite set of formulas, and prove its adequacy.
We proceed as follows: throughout the section we fix an arbitrary natural number k and
a finite set of variables A, and define a uniform construction (−)∗ which will be shown to
be adequate for every formula in 1SO{,}(A) of quantifier depth ≤ k. It clearly follows
that there is an adequate uniform construction for every finite set Γ of formulas in 1SO{,},
since we can apply the result to the maximum quantifier depth of any formula in Γ.
To simplify notation a bit, we note that it suffices to define our uniform construction
for what we may call normal one-step M-frames (X, (S, α)), satisfying the condition that
S = X, and prove that the adequacy condition holds for all models based on such frames.
It is then a straightforward matter to extend this to an adequate uniform construction
defined on all M-frames. We shall denote a normal one-step frame (X, (X,α)) more simply
by just (X,α). Then for any two normal M-models (X,α, V ) and (X ′, α′, V ′) over A, i.e.
models that are based on normal one-step frames, a relation R ⊆ X × X ′ is a one-step
(M)-bisimulation between these models if, and only if:
• uRu′ implies u ∈ V (a) iff u′ ∈ V ′(a), for all a ∈ A;
• for all Z in α there is Z ′ in α′ such that for all t′ ∈ Z ′ there is t ∈ Z with tRt′;
• for all Z ′ in α′ there is Z in α such that for all t ∈ Z there is t′ ∈ Z ′ with tRt′;
• for all u ∈ X there is u′ ∈ X ′ with uRu′;
• for all u′ ∈ X ′ there is u ∈ X with uRu′.
The last two conditions just say that the relation R is full on X and X ′. We call such
a relation a global neighborhood bisimulation between (X,α, V ) and (X ′, α′, V ′). For any
normal one-step frame (X,α), we shall construct a cover hα : (X∗, α∗) → (X,α) where
(X∗, α∗) is also a normal one-step frame. Since these are abbreviated notations for the
one-step M-frames (X, (X,α)) and (X∗, (X∗, α∗)), we should have Mhα(X∗, α∗) = (X,α),
which means that hα should be a surjective map from X∗ to X, such that Mhα(α∗) = α.
The intuition behind the construction is that we want to create infinitely many disjoint
copies of each neighborhood, and furthermore we want to create sufficiently many copies of
each state within each copy of a neighborhood.
Definition 6.14. Given a set X, and an object α ∈MX, put
X∗ := X × 2k × P(X)× ω
and let piX be the projection map from X∗ to X. Define α∗ ∈M(X∗) by setting Z ∈ α∗ for
Z ⊆ X∗ iff dY, je ⊆ Z for some Y ∈ α and some j < ω, where
dY, je := {(u, i, Y, j) | u ∈ Y, i < 2k}.
The sets of the form dY, je for Y ∈ α will be called the basic members of α∗. The set of all
elements in X∗ that do not belong to any basic member will be called the residue of the
frame (X∗, α∗). Note that X∗ is partitioned into each of the basic members along with the
residue, as an extra partition cell.
Proposition 6.15. For every given normal one-step frame (X,α), the projection map
piX : (X∗, α∗)→ (X,α) is a cover.
Proof. Clearly the projection map piX is always surjective since (u, 0, ∅, 0) 7→ u for all u ∈ X.
(Note that 0 < 2n for all n ∈ ω, so we always have (u, 0, ∅, 0) ∈ X∗.)
We need to check that MpiX(α∗) = α. In other words, we have to check that for
all Z ⊆ X, we have Z ∈ α iff pi−1X (Z) ∈ α∗. For left to right, if Z ∈ α then dZ, 0e is
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a basic member of α∗, and clearly dZ, 0e ⊆ pi−1X (Z). Conversely, suppose pi−1X (Z) ∈ α∗.
Then there is some basic member dY, je ∈ α∗ with dY, je ⊆ pi−1X (Z). But then Y ∈ α, and
furthermore Y ⊆ Z: if u ∈ Y then (u, 0, Y, j) ∈ dY, je, so (u, 0, Y, j) ∈ pi−1X (Z) meaning that
piX(u, 0, Y, j) = u ∈ Z. So Z ∈ α as required.
Our goal is to show that, for any pair of normal and globally neighborhood bisimilar
models (X,α, V ) and (Y, β, U), the corresponding models (X∗, α∗, V[piX ]) and (Y∗, β∗, U[piY ])
satisfy the same formulas in 1SO{,}(A) of quantifier depth ≤ k. It should not be too
surprising that we can prove this, but the actual proof is not entirely trivial. It suffices to
check it for formulas in which the operator  and ♦ does not occur, since over normal one-step
models this operator is easily definable using the second-order quantifiers. From now on we
keep the models (X,α, V ) and (Y, β, U) fixed, as well as a global neighborhood bisimulation
R relating these models. Throughout this section, we use the notation (X,α, V ) ≡k (Y, β, U)
to say that two one-step models satisfy the same formulas of 1SO{,}(A) with at most k
nested quantifiers.
Definition 6.16. A propositional A-type τ is a subset of A. Given a set X and a valuation
V : A → Q(X), the propositional A-type of v ∈ X is defined to be V †(v) = {a ∈ A | v ∈
V (a)}.
Given a subset Z of X∗ or Y∗, a valuation W such that W : B → Q(X∗) or W : B →
Q(Y∗), and a natural number m, the m-signature of Z over B relative to the valuation W is
the mapping σZ : P(B)→ {0, ...,m} defined by:
σZ(t) := min(|{x ∈ Z |W †(x) = t}|,m)
Definition 6.17. Let B be any set of variables containing A, and let V1 : B → Q(X∗) and
V2 : B → Q(Y∗). Then for any natural number n we write
(X∗, α∗, V1) ≈n (Y∗, β∗, V2)
and say that these one-step models match up to depth n, if:
(1) For every n-signature σ over variables B, the number of basic elements of signature σ in
α∗ and β∗ respectively are either both finite and equal, or both infinite.
(2) The residues of the two one-step models have the same n-signature.
Using the assumption that the models (X,α, V ) and (Y, β, U) are globally neighborhood
bisimilar, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 6.18. (X∗, α∗, V[piX ]) ≈2k (Y∗, β∗, U[piY ]).
Proof. To see that the residues of the two models have the same 2k-signature, for one
direction just note that if the residue of (X∗, α∗, V[piX ]) contains an element (u, i, Z, j) then
it contains infinitely many elements of the same propositional type, namely one member
(u, i, Z, p) for every p ∈ ω. But then so will the residue of (Y∗, β∗, U[piY ]): just pick some v
with uRv (again using the fact that R is a global neighborhood bisimulation). Since v /∈ ∅,
for every p ∈ ω the element (v, 0, ∅, p) will be a member of the residue of (Y∗, β∗, U[piY ]) of
the same propositional type as (u, i, Z, j).
Now for the basic elements. First note that, for any 2k-signature σ, α∗ either contains
no basic elements of signature σ, or infinitely many: if there is some basic element dZ, je of
signature σ, then for any i 6= j, the basic element dZ, ie has the same 2k-signature as dZ, je
with respect to the valuation V[piX ]. The same holds for β∗ with respect to the valuation
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U[piY ]. Hence, it suffices to show that α∗ contains a basic element of signature σ w.r.t. V[piX ]
iff β∗ contains a basic element of signature σ w.r.t U[piY ].
We consider only one direction: suppose that α∗ contains a basic element dZ, je of
signature σ, where Z ∈ α. Then there must be Z ′ ∈ β such that, for all v ∈ Z ′, there is
u ∈ Z with uRv, since R was a global neighborhood bisimulation. Furthermore, since R is
full on X, for every w ∈ Z we can pick some w′ ∈ Y with wRw′, and put
Z ′′ = Z ′ ∪ {w′ | w ∈ Z}
By monotonicity we have Z ′′ ∈ β. Furthermore, Z and Z ′′ are clearly related so that the
following back-and-forth conditions hold: for all u ∈ Z there is v ∈ Z ′′ with uRv, and for
all v ∈ Z ′′ there is u ∈ Z with uRv. Since any two states related by R have the same
propositional type, it follows that the same propositional types appear in dZ, je and dZ ′′, je.
But since both these sets contain at least 2k copies of every propositional type that appears
in them, it follows that dZ, je and dZ ′′, je have the same 2k-signature, as required.
We are going to show, by induction on a natural number m ≤ k, that if two one-step
models of the form (X∗, α∗, V1) and (Y∗, β∗, V2) match up to depth 2m, then they satisfy the
same formulas of quantifier depth m. Together with the previous lemma, it then follows that
the one-step models (X∗, α∗, V[piX ]) and (Y∗, β∗, U[piY ]) satisfy the same formulas of quantifier
depth ≤ k. For the basis case of 20 = 1, we need the following result (we recall that the case
of atomic formulas a can be safely ignored):
Lemma 6.19. Let B be a set of variables containing A, and let V1 : B → Q(X∗) and
V2 : B → Q(Y∗) be valuations such that
(X∗, α∗, V1) ≈1 (Y∗, β∗, V2)
Then these two one-step models satisfy the same atomic formulas of the one-step language
1SO{}(B).
Proof. We only prove one direction for each case.
Suppose first that
(X∗, α∗, V1) 1 p ⊆ q
where p, q ∈ B. Suppose for a contradiction that V2(p) * V2(q). Then there is some
(u, i, Z, j) ∈ Y∗ such that (u, i, Z, j) ∈ V2(p) \ V2(q). If (u, i, Z, j) comes from the residue of
(Y∗, β∗) then since the residue of (X∗, V∗) has the same 1-signature, it must contain some
element (u′, i′, Z ′, j′) of the same 1-type, and so we cannot have V1(p) ⊆ V1(p). The case
where (u, i, Z, j) comes from a basic member is similar.
Now, suppose that
(X∗, α∗, V1) 1 p
Then V1(p) ∈ α∗, so there is some basic element dZ, je ∈ α∗ with dZ, je ⊆ V1(p). There
must be some basic dZ ′, j′e ∈ β∗ of the same 1-signature over B as dZ, je, and clearly it
follows that dZ ′, j′e ⊆ V2(p) and so V2(p) ∈ β∗ as required.
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We now only need the following lemma:
Lemma 6.20. Let B be a finite set of variables containing A, let 0 < m ≤ k and let
V1 : B → Q(X∗) and V2 : B → Q(Y∗) be valuations such that
(X∗, α∗, V1) ≈2m (Y∗, β∗, V2)
Let q be any fresh variable. Then for any valuation V ′1 over B ∪ {q} extending V1 with some
value for q, there exists a valuation V ′2 over B ∪ {q} extending V2, such that
(X∗, α∗, V ′1) ≈2(m−1) (Y∗, β∗, V ′2)
and vice versa.
Proof. We only prove one direction since the other direction can be proved by a symmetric
argument.
Let V ′1 be given. By the hypothesis, for any 2m-signature σ over the variables B, the
number of basic elements of signature σ in α∗ and β∗ relative to V1 and V2 are either both
finite and the same, or both infinite. Let σ1, ..., σk be a list of all the distinct 2
m-signatures
over B such that the set of basic elements of α∗ and β∗ of signature σi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is
non-empty but finite, and let σk+1, ..., σl be a list of all the 2
m-signatures such that, for
k + 1 ≤ i ≤ l, there are infinitely many basic elements of α∗ and of β∗ of signature σi.
Then, for each i ∈ {1, ..., l}, let α∗[σi] denote the set of basic elements in α∗ of signature
σi, and similarly let β∗[σi] denote the set of basic elements of β∗ of signature σi. Then
α∗[σ1], ..., α∗[σl] is a partition of the set of basic elements of α∗ into non-empty cells, and
similarly β∗[σ1], ..., β∗[σl] is a partition of the set of basic elements of β∗.
Given the extended valuation V ′1 on X∗ defined on variables B ∪ {q}, we similarly let
τ1, ..., τk′ be a list of all the 2
m−1-signatures over B ∪ {q} such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k′, the set
of basic elements of α∗ of 2m−1-signature τi is non-empty but finite. We let τk′+1, ..., τl′
be a list of all the 2m−1-signatures over B ∪ {q} such that, for each i with k′ + 1 ≤ i ≤ l′,
the set of basic elements of α∗ of 2m−1-signature τi is infinite. Let α∗[τi] denote the set of
basic elements of α∗ of 2m−1-signature τi, so that the collection α∗[τ1], ..., α∗[τl′ ] constitutes
a second partition of the set of basic elements of α∗. It will be useful to introduce the
abbreviation D1 for the finite set α∗[σ1] ∪ ... ∪ α∗[σk], and the abbreviation D2 for the finite
set α∗[τ1] ∪ ... ∪ α∗[τk′ ].
For each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there is a bijection between the set α∗[σi] and β∗[σi], and we
can paste all these bijections together into a bijective map
f : α∗[σ1] ∪ ... ∪ α∗[σk]→ β∗[σ1] ∪ ... ∪ β∗[σk]
Since every basic element of α∗ not in D1 belongs to a 2m-signature of which there are
infinitely many basic elements in β∗, and since D1 ∪ D2 is finite, it is easy to see that
we can extend the map f to a map g which is an injection from the set D1 ∪ D2 into
the set of basic elements of β∗, such that for each basic element dZ, je in D1 ∪D2, dZ, je
and g(dZ, je) have the same 2m-signature over B, and such that g D1 = f . Each basic
element of β∗ not in the image of g must then be of one of the 2m-signatures σk+1, ..., σl,
and so we can partition the set of basic elements of β∗ outside the image of g into the cells
β∗[σk+1] \ g[D2], ..., β∗[σl] \ g[D2]. For each i with k + 1 ≤ i ≤ l, let γi1, ..., γir list all infinite
sets of the form α∗[σi]∩α∗[τj ] for k′ + 1 ≤ j ≤ l′. The list γi1, ..., γir must be non-empty, and
so since the set β∗[σi] \ g[D2] is also infinite, we may partition it into r many infinite cells
and list these as δi1, ..., δ
i
r. Now, for each basic element dZ, je of β∗, we define a map WdZ,je
from B ∪ {q} to P(dZ, je) by a case distinction as follows:
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Case 1: dZ, je = g(dZ ′, j′e) for some dZ ′, j′e ∈ D1 ∪D2. Then dZ, je and dZ ′, j′e have
the same 2m-signature over B. Using this fact we define the valuation WdZ,je so that, for
each p ∈ B, we have WdZ,je(p) = V2(p) ∩ dZ, je, and so that dZ ′, j′e and dZ, je have the
same 2m−1-signature over B ∪ {q} with respect to the valuations V ′1 and WdZ,je. We show
how to assign the value of the variable q: for each propositional type t over B ∪ {q}, there
are three different possible cases to consider. If dZ ′, j′e has m′ < 2m−1 elements of type
t ∪ {q} over B ∪ {q}, then pick m′ many elements of dZ, je of type t and mark them by q.
This is possible since m′ < 2m−1 ≤ 2m and dZ ′, j′e and dZ, je have the same 2m-signature.
If there are m′ < 2m−1 elements of dZ ′, j′e of type t over B ∪ {q}, then pick m′ elements of
dZ, je of type t over B, and mark all the other elements of dZ, je of type t by q. Finally, if
there are at least 2m−1 elements of dZ ′, j′e of type t ∪ {q} over B ∪ {q} and at least 2m−1
elements of dZ ′, j′e of type t over B ∪ {q}, then all in all there must be at least 2m elements
of dZ ′, j′e of type t over B, and so there must be at least 2m elements of dZ, je of type t over
B. Pick 2m−1 of these and mark them by q. Finally, let WdZ,je(q) be the set of elements of
dZ, je marked by q.
Case 2: dZ, je is not in the image of g. Then there must be some i ∈ {k′+ 1, ..., l′} such
that dZ, je ∈ β∗[σk+1] \ g[D2], and this set is partitioned into δi1, ..., δir. Let dZ, je ∈ δij , and
pick some arbitary element dZ ′, j′e of the set γij . Then dZ ′, j′e and dZ, je have the same
2m-signature over B and we can proceed as in Case 1.
We define the valuation V ′2 so that the intersection of V ′2(q) with the union of all the
basic members of β∗ equals the union of the sets WdZ,je(q) for dZ, je a basic element in β∗,
and so that the residue of (Y∗, β∗) has the same 2(m−1)-signature as the residue of (X∗, α∗)
with respect to the valuations V ′1 and V ′2 . This can be done using the same reasoning as in
the two previous cases. We now need to check that
(X∗, α∗, V ′1) ≈2
(m−1)
(Y∗, β∗, V ′2)
First, suppose there are infinitely many basic elements of α∗ of some 2m−1 signature τj ,
meaning that k′ ≤ j ≤ l′. Then since the set α∗[τj ] is infinite, D1 is finite and
α∗[τj ] = (D1 ∩ α∗[τj ]) ∪ (α∗[σk+1] ∩ α∗[τj ]) ∪ ... ∪ (α∗[σl] ∩ α∗[τj ])
there must be some i ∈ {k + 1, ..., l} such that the set α∗[σi] ∩ α∗[τj ] is infinite. This means
that α∗[σi] ∩ α∗[τj ] appears in the list γi1, ..., γir, and so we see that all elements of some
member of the list δi1, ..., δ
i
r will have the 2
m−1-signature τj . Since each member of this list
is infinite, we see that there must be infinitely many basic elements of β∗ of signature τj .
Conversely, suppose there are infinitely many basic elements of β∗ of 2m−1-signature τj
over B ∪{q}. Then since the image of g is finite, some of these elements must be outside the
image of g, which means that for some i ∈ {k + 1, ..., l}, some member of the list δi1, ..., δir
will consist of elements of signature τj . This means that some member of the list γ
i
1, ..., γ
i
r
will consist of elements of signature τj , and since each member of this list is infinite we see
that α∗ has infinitely many basic elements of 2m−1-signature τj over B ∪ {q}.
Finally, suppose that there are finitely many basic elements of α∗ and β∗ of 2m−1-
signature τj . We check that the mapping g restricts to a bijection between the basic elements
of α∗ and β∗ of this signature. First, g is injective and maps basic elements of α∗ of signature
τj to basic elements of β∗ of signature τj . It only remains to show that (the restriction of) g
is surjective, i.e. each basic element dZ, re of signature τj is equal to g(dZ ′, r′e) for some
dZ ′, r′e. But suppose dZ, re is not in the image of g; then it is in one of the members of the
list δi1, ..., δ
i
r for some i, and since each of these members is an infinite set of basic elements
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of the same signature, we see that there are infinitely many basic elements of β∗ of signature
τj , contrary to our assumption. Hence, the proof is done.
Theorem 6.21. The monotone µ-calculus is the neighborhood bisimulation invariant frag-
ment of monotone monadic second-order logic. In a formula:
MMSO/∼ ≡ µMML
Proof. It suffices to prove that MSO{,}/∼ is equal to µML{,}, and then apply Theorem
6.12. For this, by Theorem 1.4 it suffices in turn to prove that the construction (−)∗ is
adequate for all formulas in 1SO{,}(A) of quantifier depth ≤ k. We can prove this by
combining the last three lemmas, using Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games for the one-step language.
Lemmas 6.18 and 6.20 provide a recipe for how “Duplicator” can survive k steps of the
game comparing the models (X∗, α∗, V[piX ]) and (Y∗, β∗, U[piY ]), and 6.19 guarantees that
the valuations constructed at the end of the game will satisfy the same atomic formulas.
Working out the full argument is entirely standard, so we leave the details to the reader.
7. Future work
We conclude by mentioning some questions for future research:
(1) Is there a good categorical and “logic free” characterization of those set functors T that
admit an adequate (or weakly adequate) uniform construction, for instance, in terms of
T preserving certain limits or colimits? Trying to answer this question would involve a
deeper study of how the model theory of one-step languages is related to categorical
properties of the type functor involved. Related to this, an anonymous referee pointed
out to us that the machinery of one-step frames, covers and uniform constructions
are all taking place in the category of elements associated with the set functor T, and
properties of the functor T are closely related to properties of the corresponding category
of elements [2]. This could very well be a fruitful direction to investigate further.
(2) Can we improve our work on the supported companion functor, to the effect that
every set functor T has a companion T′ that admits an adequate uniform construction?
Relating this to the previous question, we would like to understand why the supported
companion to M admits an adequate uniform construction, but not M itself. The
construction achieves two things, in general: first, it ensures that every α ∈ TX has a
unique smallest support (even when X is infinite), often called its base. Second, and in
our view more importantly, we get that the map baseX : TX → PX defined by sending
each α to its base is a natural transformation. Conditions for a functor under which this
holds has been isolated by Gumm in [9]. Are these conditions related to the existence of
adequate uniform constructions?
(3) It would be interesting to further explore the relation between MSOT and the first-order
logic of Litak & alii [17] for T-coalgebras. For instance, an interesting question would
be whether (on T-tree models) MSOT is equivalent to some extension of this first-order
language with fixpoint operators.
(4) Finally, there is the question of finding sufficient and necessary conditions for a Janin-
Walukiewicz theorem to hold. Related to this question, we have not been able to
produce an example of a functor for which the Janin-Walukiewicz theorem does not
hold (the question of whether such an example can be found was raised to us by an
anonymous referee). Given all that we can say for sure, it could be the case that a
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Janin-Walukiewicz theorem simply holds for every set functor, but we conjecture that
at least some conditions on the functor are required.
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